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CHAPTER I - PROBLEM STATEMENT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Many different approaches have been taken to try to identify models of union 
status/membership determination. The most successful course of action has to been to 
attempt to identify worker s preferences for union representation independent of the 
employment decision. If this is not done, it is difficult to discern if union status is due to 
preferences for union services or if it is simply a result of the employment process. 
Many facets of collcctive bargaining have public good aspects. In the absencc of a 
union shop, unions are required to represent all workers assigned to a given bargaining unit, 
regardless of whether a worker pays dues. Unions can influence which jobs are included in a 
bargaining unit, but arc obliged to bargain for all workers regardless of membership status. 
Oisen (1965) claims that if a large group providing a collcctivc good is to exist, it must be 
formed either with compulsory membership or with joint production of an excludable (club or 
private) good that it can tie to membership. Unions have used this argument to lobby for 
union security laws. The standard result is that if agents have incentives to free ride, there will 
be a sub-optimal provision of the public good. If the free rider problem is severe, the group 
will fail to form. However, unions have been able to exist in the absence of union security 
laws (Hundley 1993. Booth 1985). The question is how arc unions able to overcome the fi^ee 
rider problem and arrive at a quasi-cooperative solution? Is it the reputation' or the "warm 
glow" effects that can only be obtained by being a union member or arc unions able to 
'in Booth (1985) reputation is a private good that can only be obtained Joining the union. Thus, there is a disutility 
associated with being a free rider. 
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partially excludc non-mcmbcrs from wage gains, grievance procedures, and other union 
services that they are legally bound to provide to free riders? 
The primary objective of this study was to identify a model of the membership/free 
rider decision conditional on current employment. Bargaining for wage increases and job 
security are the major services that a union provides to members and free riders. The ability 
to measure wage increases across individuals and across time is important in determining the 
relative importance of public versus private good aspects of wage bargaining. One would 
expect that an indixidual's membership decision would be more responsive to idiosyncratic 
wage increases than to wage increases that go to all employees. Grievance procedures are 
one way that unions can provide workers with a vehicle for job security. In times of lower 
demand, workers will perceive it more likely that they will be laid off or will be shifted to a 
different job. This would increase the probability that a individual worker would have a 
confrontation with management and thus make it more likely that the individual would want to 
use grievance procedures set up by the collective bargaining agreement. The rules and 
procedures for handing grievances are clearly a public good generated by the bargaining 
proccss. However, one can view an individuaKs use of the grievance procedures as a private 
good. This is particularly true if the union can and docs pursue grievances more aggressively 
for union members. 
A secondary objective is to model public sector quits. Labor supply to the public 
sector is of interest in its own right. However, there is an ulterior motive for looking at quits. 
Occupational choice and membership choice are not necessarily independent decisions. It is 
reasonable to assume that factors that affect union membership would also affect occupational 
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choicc. Those workers who have chosen not to remain in the public sector are not observed. 
Thus, there is a potential for non-random sample selection to bias the estimates. A model of 
quits can be used to develop controls for the potential selection bias. 
I use a data set that is very rich in wage information which allows me to develop 
measures for the union's bargaining success that vary over time and across individuals. In 
addition, I can measure an individual's earnings relative to other employees in the individual's 
narrowly defined job in Iowa state government. In addition, 1 am able to measure 
employment changes within an individual's job or bargaining unit and within the state 
government as a whole. Thus, it is possible to determine the relative importance of private 
and public good aspects of union services in the union membership decision. 
1.2 Pre\ious Research 
Many authors have examined various aspects of collective bargaining coverage and^or 
union membership. Studies of the allocation of workers between coverage and membership 
states have run headlong into the partial observability problem. That is, the employment 
decision and the representation decision are observed jointly. Farber (1983) points out that 
attempts to identify simple probit or logit models of union status when partial observability 
exists have not been very satisfactory. Instead, many authors have tried to model situations 
where the worker's preferences are directly or indirectly observable and/or the employment 
decision can be separated from the coverage/membership decision. 
Farber and Saks (1980) developed a model of vote determination in National Labor 
Relations Board representation elections. The unique feature of this study is that workers' 
preferences for union representation are observed independent of the employment decision. 
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The authors use data gathered from interviews of workers who participated in NLRB 
representations elections. Interviewers observed how individuals voted in the election along 
with potential explanatory variables such as the individual's position on the intra-firm earnings 
distribution, seniority, race, sex. education, and age. Also observed were the individual's 
evaluation of the union s potential eflfect on relations with management, the probability of the 
worker being promoted, satisfaction with currcnt job security, and the difficulty of finding an 
equivalent job. 
The authors'main result is that workers at the lower end of the intra-firm earnings 
distribution tend be more likely to vote for union representation. This is presumably due to 
the empirical exndcnce that unions tend to raise average wage and decrease the variance of 
wage distributions within firms. However, this docs not necessarily imply that they will join 
the union if it is certified (assuming they have the choice). Lower-paid workers may have the 
same or greater incentive to free ride as workers on the upper-end of the wage distribution. 
The nonwage aspects of collective bargaining seem to have all the hypothesized 
cffccts. Workers were less likely to vote for the union if they felt that the labor/management 
relationship would deteriorate if a union were certified, if they felt that they had a good chance 
for promotion, or if they felt it would be difficult to find an equivalent job. Individuals that 
felt they were being unfairly treated or were dissatisfied with job security were more likely to 
vote for union certification. The authors found that sex. education and urban upbringing did 
not have a statistically significant impact on vote while age and race did have a significant 
impact on voting. Nonwhites and younger workers were more likely to vote for union 
representation. Farber and Saks suggest that older workers have fewer years of labor supply 
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remaining to enjoy any benefits of unionization and could face more difficulties in finding 
alternative employment should they lose their current job. Nonwhites may pcrceive that they 
ha\'C a greater chance of experiencing discrimination by management and thus may benefit 
more by the establishment of union grievance procedures. 
The importance of the Farbcr and Saks study is that it gets around the partial 
observability problem. The fact that it looks only at establishments that actually hold elections 
docs limit the inferences that can be made about the population as a whole. Industries and 
firms with unions that have been established for a number of years may be substantially 
different from those currently holding elections. Thus, the results may not be representative 
of the population as a whole. In addition, the membership/free-rider decision is not addressed. 
Farber (1983) develops a model of union status that incorporates two diflferent 
dccision-makers, workers and potential union employers, and allows for an cxcess supply of 
workers for union jobs. Using a 1977 cross section of data fi-om the Quality of Employment 
Survey. Farber is able to identify individuals in nonunion jobs that desire union coverage. At 
the time of hire, workers in the sample arc observed in one of three possible states; employed 
in a union job and preferring a union job, employed in a nonunion job and preferring a 
nonunion job. and employed in a nonunion job but preferring a union job. The author 
assumed that if a worker was employed in a union job he/she desired a union job. Thus. 
cxccss demand for union jobs is restricted to be non-negative. This restriction certainly seems 
to be reasonable and should not limit the usefulness of the results. 
The author argues that modeling the union status determination in this fashion is much 
more enlightening than simple probit or logit analysis where both supply and demand factors 
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arc afFccting the allocation of workers across coverage states. Farbcr points out that Poirier 
(1980) did develop an approach to identify and estimate models of union status when partial 
observability exists. However, the results required strict assumptions on functional forms that 
Farbcr claims have not proven useful in empirical applications. 
The results from Farber's queuing model are quite interesting and shed a great deal of 
light on the determination of union status in the labor market. Farber's calculations indicate 
that nonwhites are significantly more likely to desire union jobs and to be working on a union 
job. The probability that a nonwhite is hired to a union job given that he/she desires a union 
job is not found significantly different than for whites. The low incidence of unionized 
workers in the south is found to be due both to lower demand for union jobs and lower supply 
of union jobs. The author also finds differences in unionization for his four major aggregate 
job classifications: professional and technical, service, clerical, and blue-collar workers. While 
bluc-collar workers are more likely to be unionized than are other types of workers, the 
source of the variation is different for each job class. Clerical workers are less likely to be 
unionized because they are less likely to desire a union and less likely to be hired to a union 
job given that they desire one. Service workers are no less likely to desire a union job than 
bluc-collar workers. However they are much less likely to be hired to a union job given they 
desire one. Professional and technical workers are less likely to be unionized because they are 
less likely to desire a union job and not because they are less likely to find a union job. 
Furthermore, older workers are less likely to be unionized predominantly because they are less 
likely to desire union representation. 
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Chaison and Dhavalc (1992) use a method similar to that used here. They examine the 
choicc between union membership and free riding using 1988 Current Population Survey data. 
Respondents to the CPS indicate if they are currently covcred by a collective bargaining 
agreement and whether they are currently members of a union or employee association similar 
to a union. The analysis is limited to union workers in the twenty-one right-to-work states 
and pubic sector union employees where union security laws are illegal. Thus, each worker 
clearly has the choicc between free riding or becoming a union member. However, the 
authors do reference studies that indicate that a fair percentage of residents of right-to-work 
states do not understand that they have this choicc. 
Chaison and Dhavale conduct probit analysis of the union member/free rider decision. 
Their results are not dramatically diflferent from previous studies. They find that female. 
white, pan-time, and more educated workers are more likely to free ride while older workers 
arc more likely to be union members. Weekly earnings arc negatively related to free riding. 
This result seems to run counter to Farber and Saks (1980). However, the results are not 
necessarily contradictor>'. it is not surprising that lower wage jobs are more likely to become 
unionized. This certainly docs not imply that low-wage workers will have less incentive to 
free ride once the job in unionized. It is conceivable that they would have more. Income 
constraints may preclude them from becoming union members. Also, if wage gains and union 
membership are both endogenous, one would expect to find unions with the smallest degree of 
free riding at the upper end of the wage distribution. 
The richness of wage information is a significant advantage that my study has over 
Chaison and Dhavales'. In addition to a current wage rate, 1 also know the position the 
individual occupics on the wage distribution relative to other workers in the same job. Also. 1 
can relate his pay gains to the pay of other workers in similar jobs within and outside of the 
state government. Furthermore. 1 have intertemporal variation in the union s ability to secure 
wage gains for each particular job and for all jobs within the state government. This quality of 
data has not been found in other studies. In addition, the data compiled in this study includes 
pricing information for the unions. This allows me to estimate the effects of the dues rates 
and the substitutability of other workers' contributions for their own contributions. 
Hundley (1993) develops a multinomial logit model of union status of public sector 
workers. The author uses 1985 Current Population Survey data to identify public sector 
workers occupying one of three states: not covcred by collective bargaining, covered 
members and covered nonmembers. This distinction is important since the incidence of 
covered non-membership is much greater in the public sector than in the private sector. Using 
interstate data, the author examines the effects of various bargaining laws on union coverage 
and membership. The author also includes a host of personal and job characteristics in the 
model. However, the author provides little justification for their inclusion and does not report 
the parameter estimates for these variables. Thus, the results are not extremely useful for my 
study since preferences for collective bargaining are examined within a set of bargaining laws 
rather than across legal frameworks. 
Booth (1985) is one of the few theoretical papers on union membership. Booth 
develops a social customs model of union membership in a theoretical context. Agent's utility 
functions are assumed to be defined over reputation and exogenously determined wages. The 
agents' reputations are determined by their choice to join the union or to free ride and how 
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Other agents in the model view their actions. Thus, the ability of others in the community to 
impose sanctions on free riders greatly influences the ability of the union to overcome the free 
rider problem and survive. Unions that have more homogenous members and that have 
members who work in close proximity would seem to have an advantage in imposing 
sanctions on free-riders. The author demonstrates that under certain conditions even large 
unions can overcome the free rider. 
i.3 Overview of the Dissertation 
This study develops a model of union membership. This model will allow for workers 
covcred by collective bargain to make the choice between union membership and free-riding 
on the contribution of others. The ability to completely free ride is a feature found in the 
public scctor and private sector where "Right to Work" laws have been enacted. Data for 
Iowa state employees is used to estimate the model. In addition a model of public sector quits 
is also developed. The estimates from this model are used to develop statistical controls for 
the potential bias from non-random selection of public scctor workers. 
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model of union membership with a discrete 
membership choice. Chapter 3 provides a description of the data used. Chapter 4 develops 
the empirical model of union membership with the Iowa state employee data. Public sector 
quits arc analyzed in Chapter 5. This chapter includes estimates of the impact of comparable 
worth wage gains on quits. The union demand model is reestimated with selection controls in 
Chapter 6. The estimates are used to calculate the impact of comparable worth on union 
membership. Chapter 7 summarizes the results and provides direction for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THEORETICAL MODEL OF UNION MEMBERSHIP 
2.1 Introduction 
Unions are required to provide bargaining services to all covered workers without 
regard to workers' membership in the union, unless state laws allow union securit>' clauses to 
be included in collective bargaining contracts. Union security clauses allow unions to force 
all workers covered by the collective bargaining contract to pay union dues. Unions cannot 
force workers to become members of the union because of freedom of association. They can 
require workers to pay fees to cover the costs of bargaining. The fees are typically less than 
the dues required to be a fiill member of the union. When unions obtain a collective 
bargaining contract, the contract covers ail workers regardless of their union membership. In 
cases where workers cannot be forced to pay dues, it is quite plausible that unions would still 
have a mechanism for excluding non-payers for a portion of the services that they are legally 
bound to provide. This provides the motivation for describing union membership in the 
context of a joint product model similar to that used in Sandler and Murdoch (1990). Paying 
union dues will be modeled as producing public and private services for union workers. The 
ability of the union to withhold services from nonmembers would then depend on the degree 
to which membership produces public versus private goods and how each is valued by the 
2.2 Joint Product Model of the Demand for Union Services 
Assume that an individual / chooses voluntary contributions to the union, .v,. Using .r„ 
the union produces a pure public good, z„ and a private good, q„ in the following manner; 
worker. 
q, = f(x.) 
= g(x J 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
II  
r and g' are strictly greater than zero and/" and g" are less than or equal to zero. Since z, is a 
public good, agent i consumes the total amount of z that the union produces. That is, he or 
she consumes 
^ = Z> r,. (2.3) 
Z' is the total amount of the public good produced by agents other than agent /. .Assume that 
all individuals have identical production functions for the public good that exhibit constant 
returns to scale. That is, contributions made by others will be perfect substitutes for their 
own contributions in the production of the pubic good Z. Making this assumption allows us 
to e.xpress the total quantity of the public good as 
Z , = g ( X ] ^ x J  ( 2 . 4 )  
Where 
i *  J  
.A.gents derive utilit>' from consumption of the jointly produced public and private goods and 
from a composite good, _v, which is purchased in a perfectly competitive market. Utility for 
agent i can thus be e.xpressed as 
u .  =  ( y , .  q , . Z," r, )• (2.6) 
u is maximized with respect to the budget constraint /, = p^\ + p^x.. I. is the nominal income 
of agent i and the p's are the respective prices. The utility maximization problem for agent / 
is 
(2.7) 
Maximize ui(yi.f(xi).g(x'-^xi)j 
x..y. 
Subject to: Ii = p y • + p^ xi • 
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The model above is similar to that used by Sandler and Murdoch (1990) to determine 
Nash-Coumot versus Lindahl behavior for military alliances. They derive demand equations 
for the aggregate level of .v. By including spill-ins in the income term" a nested test of the 
joint product model can be obtained by testing for the existence of an X" term in the demand 
function. When the value of spill-ins is included in the income term, the pure public good 
model implies that should not be a separate argument in the demand function. X" 
contributing significantly implies that that this is an impure public good. The joint product 
model may then be appropriate. I express the demand functions in term of the individuals 
contributions. Clearly, the two methods are equivalent. .A.ctually observing the level of 
public and private goods an agent receives would provide a direct test of the publicness of 
the good. 
The first order conditions from the maximization problem in (2.7) are 
<0. 
c-.v, (2.5.4; 
Cll C^ll 
~/'(-V,) + ^g\x - A'," 0. and fl.SB) 
cq^ cz, 
-  P . } \  -  ' ' - • S O  
.Assuming an interior solution, the system of equations in (^2.8J can be solved for 
demand functions and indirect utility functions. The demand for union services (the supply 
of contributions to the union) would be 
"This IS done by deriving the demand equations in terms of aggregate contributions. Thus the value of spill-ins p,X',. is 
added to the income term in the demand equation for X. The joint product model implies that the reduced form demand for 
will still have an additional X* as an argument. This specification can be used to test the joint product versus the pure 
public good model. 
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A-,- = X i i  I i .p .,.p (2.9) 
This demand function is the optimal contribution to the union by an individual. 
Comparative static exercises can be performed to identify how optimal contributions change 
when prices, income, or contributions of others change. A comparative static that will be of 
particular interest will be how the optimal contribution changes as X" changes. In general 
will be ambiguous. An increase in A' causes an increase in spill-ins. The income 
effect implies that the agent would want to consume more of all goods. Because the agents 
are now given more of the public good, they would tend to substitute towards the private 
goods and away from contributions to the public good. A further ambiguity is introduced 
through the jointness in production of q and r. The only way an individual can consume 
more of the private good q is to also produce more z. As will be demonstrated, the results are 
ambiguous. 
With regularity conditions on preferences and technology and a few additional 
assumptions, most of the comparative static results, including have unambiguous 
signs. To this end. assume that 
.V, r, 
(2.1 OA) 
(2.1 OB) 
^  < 0 ,  
c q c z :  
(2. IOC) 
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The conditions above are needed to provide unambiguous signs for most of the 
comparative statics. The conditions imply that v and q. and y and r are net substitutes in 
consumption, and that q and r arc net complements. There is no overwhelming reason to 
think that these conditions will hold. However, the conditions in (2.10) are certainly 
reasonable, especially for the problem at hand. It is plausible that q and r are identical goods 
cxccpt for the union s ability to exclude non-payers from consumption. That is the goods 
produced by the union are partially excludable. Thus, q and r would be additive in the utility 
functions. The following example will illustrate this point. Assume that union services arc 
completely represented by wage increases. It is conceivable that the union can reserve part of 
the wage increase for members only with the remaining increase shared by all members, in 
this ease, the workers'utility would depend on only the sum of the public and private wage 
increases. The conditions in (2. JO) will hold in general for all strongly additive utility 
functions. Strongly additive utility functions have cross partial derivatives that are equal to 
zero. 
The derivation of the comparative static results is in appendix AI. Table 2.1 
summarizes the directions of change in x and y when income, prices and contributions of 
others changc. All of the results in Table 2.1 assume that the conditions in (2.10) hold. 
Without these conditions, all of the comparative statics in Table 2.1 would have ambiguous 
signs. Especially interesting is the rcsuh that individual contributions decrease as 
contributions of others increase. This implies that individuals substitute away from own 
production of q and r when X' increases. 
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Table 2.1 - Summan- of Comparative Static 
Partial of Sign Partial ofjc, Sign 
c\\'cX' (-) cx/X* (-) 
(-) cx/ai. (-) 
cyv'cp. (-) dx/dp^. (?) 
d\'/dp. (?) ax/5p. (-) 
2.3 Economic Efficicncy of Union Contributions 
.Y, is the individuals' contribution in a competitive environment. This in general will 
not be a Pareto efficient level of contributions. Agents do not take into account the spill-ins 
that they create for other agents when they produce more q and r. Thus, they tend to stop 
short of socially optimal levels of contributions. Pareto efficient allocations could be 
obtained if all individuals were required to contribute to the collective good up to the point 
where the social marginal rate of substitution between .r and v equals the relative price. To 
see this, consider an economy with n agents numbered Each agent has optimization 
problem of the form in (2.7j. The conditions for Pareto optimal allocation can be derived 
from the following optimization; 
Maximize. u\<> [•/(xi).g(x\~ x'\» 
X - •  x . . y .  • y .  
Subject lo: ui(y,-fix,J.g(xi - X')J ^ V/=2.3 n  
(2.11) 
i = l 
i = l 
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X" and Y" arc ihc total amount of .v and y available to the economy. U!' is a fixed level of 
utility for each individual i equal to 2 through n. The first order conditions for a Pareto 
optimal allocation can be expressed as 
/-(.V, )+^^g\x,+X')+^Y<0 frj, rz, 
V f(x, )-•/, ^ -^^g\x,+X')+'^rt ^ g'(x^-i-Xl)-A,<0 i =2.3 n: y,=l 
rtj 4 1 i / f  
y£!l£.-<0, ; = 2,3 n 
O', 
{>',. ). +-^,')'  ^  ° ^  0 /oral! /=2.3 n 
A-^-Xr,<0 
i - l  
y-t.y.^O 
J i 
where y,- s are Lagrange multipliers that represent to the shadow price of the other agents 
marginal utility. 
In general, the competitive allocation will result in less than the efficient level of .r 
being contributed. This occurs because there is a positive increment to j's utility when i 
increases contributions to the union. The marginal benefit of spill-ins is represented by 
Z y i .  ^ g X n  + x l ) .  a j 3 )  
i . i  '--t 
k ^ i  
This is the benefit that others receive when agent i contributes to the union. This is not 
captured in a competitive pricing system. Cooperative solutions could reach a Pareto superior 
allocation if agents could be subsidized for these spill-ins. Agents could be taxed the value of 
the marginal benefit they receive in spill-ins. However, without some preference revelation 
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mechanism this is generally not possible. Agents usually have an incentive to understate 
their true benefit from spill-ins. Thus, voluntary contributions will not reach optimal levels 
of provision by Pareto criteria. 
2.4 Joint Product Model with Discrete Contributions 
Imposing further restrictions on the maximization in (2.7j will make the analysis 
more realistic. .Assume that individuals are faced with the decision to contribute voluntarily 
to the union (become members of the union) but they have to contribute an exogenously 
determined^ dues level x". That is. they have to purchase union services in discrete 
increments. In addition, assume that agents have identical utility functions except for a 
vector of taste parameters T. Individuals will choose either to pay dues, or to contribute 
nothing and completely free-ride on other members' contributions. The individual's problem 
in (2.7) becomes a discrete choice of whether to contribute to the union with the additional 
constraint that .r, must be equal to constant amount x . This can be expressed as 
Maximize (2.14) 
Subject to : I —p^y\ -^p 
This maximization yields an indirect utility function of the form 
. (2.15) 
The agent chooses between two different allocations: one with .r '=(? and one with x '=.v". 
Thus, an agent will join the union if and only if 
-Exogenous to the worker, .t" could be set endogenously by unions. 
18 
v ( x ' = x \ p ^ , p ^ . x : j ^ . i ) - v { x ' = o , p ^ , p ^ . x : j ^ , T ) > Q .  (2.16) 
Otherwise, the individual will choose to free ride on the production of the public good 
provided by other union members. Furthermore there is a critical value of .v^. call it .v', 
beyond which it is no longer optimal for the individual to contribute to the union. By 
definition .Y" solves 
Provided that the union can set dues such that.v" does not exceed .v", the individual will be a 
member of the union. Otherwise, the individual will choose to free ride on the provision of 
the public good by other agents. 
Figure 2.1 graphs and V(x'=0,...J asjc" varies holding other arguments 
constant. This illustrates that as long as the required contribution is less than the critical 
value the individual will choose to be a union member. Once x" exceeds .v', the agent no 
longer joins the union and will only purchase the composite good y. '=x",...) has a unique 
I7x' = x' p^.p,.X', = 0p^.p^.x'-I:.Tj = 0. (2.17) 
\ I * - 0 . 
Figure 2.1 - Member and Non-member Utility 
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maximum that corresponds the optimal x, in (2.7). In other words, this is what the agent 
would do if she were not constrained to contribute to the union in discrete amounts. 
It is common to assume in the context of the unconstrained problem (2.7) that an 
interior solution will be reached and that ail agents would contribute. That is equivalent to 
saving that for equilibrium prices and income, V() is positively sloped for all agents at .v =0. 
Clearly in the constrained model there may be complete free-riders for whom x" > .r'". The 
interior solution assumption is usually made when modeling collective behavior of large 
groups such as cities, states or countries where a representative agent's utility is being 
maximized. In this case we want to model the decisions of heterogeneous individuals. Thus 
for <'2.14). there is not a compelling reason to assume that x" will always be positive. Given 
priccs, tastes, income and X*, it may well be that x" is zero for some individuals. 
Figure 2.2 represents the utility maximization problem in (2.14). Point A represents 
the consumption bundle of a free-rider. Point B is the consumption bundle of a union 
member. Given the constraints in the optimization problem, the only feasible budget set is 
bounded by line (l/py)AX' but also includes the point B. Thus, the efficient consumption set 
contains only point A and point B. The slope of line AB is equal to the negative of the price 
ratio. The line AB is the part of the budget constraint from (2.7). Unless agents arc identical, 
most agents optimization will result in a comer solution. The marginal rate of substitution will 
not be set equal to the price ratio. Given that the prices in the model reflect the true social 
cost of-x- and w then a competitive solution has an additional source of inefficiency. How it 
compares to the allocation resulting from (2.7) is not dear. It depends upon how close the 
required contribution is set to each individual's optimal contribution. A union that could 
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Figure 2.2 - Utility Maximization with Discrete Union Contributions 
pcrfcctly discriminate could set prices such that each agent contributes the socially optimal 
amount"'. In this case, there would be no complete free-riders. However, there could be 
members who are not required to contribute. It is likely that x" is set in such a manner that the 
aggregate contributions would be further from the socially optimal solution than the allocation 
resulting from (2.7). Furthermore, because most agents will not be setting their own marginal 
rate of substitution equal to relative price, an additional source of inefficiency is addcd'\ 
However, making eflicicncy comparisons is in general not possible. Cases exist such that 
(2.7) and (2.14) would result in Pareto non-comparable allocations. 
^This would mean selling ihc pricc of union serv ices equal lo marginal social benefii of x. 
'unless y is such ihai each agcni is contribuiing the socially opiimal amount. 
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Sufficient but not necessar>' conditions for membership and for complete free-riding 
can also derived by examining the slope of the indifference curve at point A and point B. A 
sufficient condition for free riding would be if at point A 
ail 
(2.18) 
In this case the indirect utility function is negatively sloped at x" = 0. This corresponds to 
indifference curve U, in figure (2.2). No matter how small the required contribution is the 
agent will never choose to join the union (unless x" was zero). Likewise, a sufficient 
condition for union membership would be if at point B 
Cll. 
cii. 
(2.19) 
P. 
In this case the optimal value of x is greater than the required contribution. This 
corresponds to the indifference curve U; in figure (2.2). The agent would produce more of q 
and z if contributions were not constrained at .t". When neither of these conditions hold, 
knowing the slope the indifference curves is not enough. One must look at the level of utility 
at the two points A and B. This corresponds to indifference curve U3 in figure (2). This is 
the case where the indifference map reaches a tangent on the line segment AB 
An individual will only pay dues if the .r" < .v^. In other words, .r' is the maximum amount 
that an individual would be willing to contribute to insure that the level of public good is 
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incremented above Z*. The probability that an individual joins the union is the probability 
that .v" < .y' . That is 
P(x, = x"j - Pfxf > a" ;  =  p r v ( x i  =  x " j  >  y ( x i  =  o j j .  a 2 0 j  
The question is. how does the willingness to pay for union services, .v^. vary as the 
demographic and job characteristics vary? In addition, what are the relative importance of the 
public and private good aspects of union services? Existence of private good aspects of 
bargaining services implies that unions are able to exclude, at least imperfectly, non-members 
from receiving the benefits that unions are legally bound to provide to all covered workers. 
Paying union dues reveals individuals' willingness to pay for union services, especially if the 
public and private components can be dichotomized. It is the willingness to pay that will be 
empirically modeled. 
2.5 Supply of Union Ser>'ices 
Union management must decide how to set the dues charged for its services. Assume 
that union must provide equal services to all covered workers without regard to membership. 
Theretore. costs of providing union representation does not vary with union membership or the 
required contribution .v". Costs could vary as the total number of covered workers varies. This 
seems to be reasonable in the short run since the size of the bargaining unit is deter-mined 
before the bargaining process. In addition, a considerable ponion of bargaining costs could be 
fixed. Giv en this, unions can be viewed as maximizing total dues revenue by choosing the 
price for union membership p^. Total union membership is simply the number of workers 
whose critical value, x^, equals or exceeds union dues. If the union could set a for each 
individual, they would simply set p^ such that = -v". In this case all workers would choose 
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to join the union. A more realistic scenario is that the union must set dues based on 
uniformly based on occupational characteristics. 
Define M as total membership of the union. A/ can be expressed as 
M  - ^  /«, (.r l i ,  X i .  T i )  ( 2 . 2 1 )  
i = l 
Where 
m 
u c 
0 if X > X 
u c 
1 if X < X 
(2.22) 
To maximize resources the union would set p^ such that 
= (2.23) 
Thus, unions would set dues at the point where the price elasticity of membership equals 1. 
The union can maximize collections by setting dues such that an agent's critical value 
is as closc to .v" possible. Thus, a union that is able to set dues over a more homogenous set 
of workers will have an advantage in collecting dues. 
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CHAPTER 3 - DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
3.1 Introduction 
One s ability to identify individual demand for union services is heavily dependent on 
the ability to observe workers'preference for union representation and member services. This 
can be difficult when union membership is not voluntary. In addition, measuring one of union 
primary duties, to bargain over wages, is sometimes difficult. This is especially acute in public 
sector labor markets. Wage gains in the public sector have been traditionally across the board 
increases with little changc in relative wages. This makes it difficult to separate the effects of 
wages from other effects. 
The primary source of data for this study is payroll records for state employees in 
Jowa. This provides information on state wages, employment status and demographic 
information. Wage information is also derived from the Current Population Survey data. This 
information is used to measure external wages. 
3.2 Description of the Data 
The data consists of payroll records for employees in the Iowa state goverrmient. 
Each individual's payroll record is observed every December from 1980-1992. Employment in 
the Iowa state government runs in the neighborhood of 18-20,000 employees each year. 
Approximately 13,000 of these employees are in unionized jobs. Thus, there is an ample 
amount of data to work with. 
The variables used to model union membership and quits are defined in the next 
section (3.3.) The data includes employees in jobs that are covered by a collective bargaining 
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contract and those workers whose job is not covcred by collective bargaining.'' The 
membership status is also observed for those workers covcred by collective bargaining. 
Data on the dues required for membership was compiled and merged with the payroll 
data. For those workers who pay dues this is straightforward. The payroll data indicates for 
what local the dues are being withheld. For non-members it is more difficuh to determine to 
which local they would pay. For most situations, all employees in same job and division' paid 
to the same local. However, there were cases where no employees in a particular job and 
division paid union dues. In these cases, the divisions were combined by successively 
truncating the division code. With each truncation, the dues structure for the union/local 
associated with most employees was merged into the data where dues had not yet been 
determined. This was repeated until all covered employees had been assigned a dues 
structure. Once this information had been merged into the data, measures for the required 
dues contributions and the contributions of others in the bargaining unit were derived. 
The average dues rate each year in real and nominal terms is displayed in Figure 3.1. 
There is not a great deal of change in real dues over time. Most of the dues rates work out to 
about 1.2% of the individuals biweekly salary, in other words, about one hour of the standard 
80 hour pay period. However, there arc differences between the locals, and most of the locals 
changed their pricing structure at least one time during the sample period. 
'' Some jobs arc not eligible for collective bargaining while other jobs arc eligible but arc not unionized. The majority of 
iraditionally union jobs in the Iowa state government are organized. The allocations of individuals across coverage 
states will not be modeled, [n other words. [ model the union membership decision given that the worker is in a union 
job. 
These are the five digit job classification codes and ten digit division codes in the payroll data. 
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Figure 3.1 - Average Annual Dues Rates in Real and Nominal Terms, 1981-1992 
Measures for external wages are taken from Current Population Survey data. Wages 
for detailed jobs are taken from the March Current Population Survey from 1980-1993". The 
March Sur\'cy includes data on hourly earnings and occupation for a portion of the 
respondents. .AJI average hourly wage is computed for each CPS detailed job. Two-year 
averages are then taken for each detailed occupation. These detailed jobs are mapped to a 
corresponding job or jobs within the Iowa state government payroll data and the CPS wages 
were merged with the payroll data based on the occupational mapping. 
The hourly wage data was not available for 1980-1982. This data was imputed using the predicted values frotn a 
regression o^ the log of hourly earning on the log or annual earnings, hours, sex . age and education and the Consumer 
price index and a trend. At the individual level, this regression explained 62% or the variability in log hourly earnings. 
The predicted values were used lo compute an average hourly wage for each occupation. 
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Averages for individual and job characteristics arc reported in Table 3.1 for union 
members, covered nonmembers and employees not covered by collective bargaining. 
Consistent with previous studies, wages for jobs that arc not covered by collcctive bargaining 
arc on average higher than unionized positions. This is consistent with previous studies that 
suggest lower wage jobs are more likely to become unionized. Also, free riders seem to be 
Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Iowa State Government Employees by 
Collective Bargaining Status, 1981-1992 
Union Members Covered Non- Not Covered 
Members 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Exit* 0.067 0.250 0.082 0.274 0.094 0.292 
New ElBtraat 0.029 0.167 0.105 0.307 0.085 0.279 
dln(.Miaimum Wage) 0.053 0.047 0.049 0.041 0.045 0.042 
dlnCWagc) 0.074 0.100 0.074 0.126 0.075 0.128 
dln(CPS Wage) 0.043 0.040 0.042 0.049 0.057 0.067 
lnfWagc)(-l 6.575 0.288 6.502 0.308 6.741 0.474 
IB(CPS Wage)n 6.433 0.302 6.422 0.303 6.554 0.375 
Pay Step 1.164 0.093 1.139 0.096 1.165 O.117 
dlii( FTE) 
-0.006 0.033 -0.002 0.034 0.003 0.033 
Over ciinc Indicator 0.523 0.499 0.427 0.495 0.087 0.281 
Dues 167.911 37.654 169.580 31.530 0.000 0.000 
Total Dues /I.OOO 156.668 96.087 138.202 90.162 0.000 0.000 
State Tenure 10.500 7.491 9.766 8.042 11.676 9.021 
Prior Experieace 13.035 9.319 14.052 10.073 13.436 9.777 
Part Time 0.012 0.109 0.035 0.184 0.055 0.228 
Non-White 0.042 0.201 0.043 0.203 0.036 0.185 
Kemaie 0.429 0.495 0.492 0.500 0.509 0.500 
Married 0.661 0.473 0.645 0.479 0.697 0.459 
Manager 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.145 0.352 
Professional 0.137 0.344 0.183 0.387 0.412 0.492 
Teciinicaf 0.116 0.320 0.175 0.380 0.056 0.230 
Clerical 0.153 0.360 0.309 0.462 0.290 0.454 
Scrvice/Blue Collar 0.594 0.491 0.333 0.471 0.097 0.296 
n 55.721 103.380 76.995 
• The V ariablc Exil only ha.'i values for employees in 1981 lo 1991 since 1992 is Ihe final year of data. 
28 
paid less and receive smaller wage increases on average than union members. 
Statewide membership rates for males and females are displayed in Figure 3.2. Union 
membership trended upward in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Presumably, a large part of 
this upswing is the result of comparable worth wage gains. A portion of the increase in 
membership could be related to a standofif between the state governor and the unions over 
i — M a l e  
Membership i 
M Female i 
Membership \ 
^ - All I 
Figure 3.2 - Union Membership Rates for Males, Females and Overall, 1981-1992 
wage increases the state tried to hold back during budget shortfalls that occurred at the end of 
the 1980s. Whatever the cause, the models estimated for both union membership and for 
quits will include annual dummy variables to control for macro effects. Males have a 
uniformly higher incidence of union membership than do females. This is not to say that 
females are more likely to be free riders than otherwise equivalent males. Some might suggest 
that this would be due to females being less attached to the labor market. Farber and Saks 
(1980) find evidence to the contrary. Females do tend to inhabit the lower portion of the 
= 0.45 
g- 0.40 
^ 0.35 
^ 0.30 
29 
wage distribution. It may be that otherwise equivalent females are more likely to be union 
members. The results of this study will help to resolve this question. 
Descriptive statistics for covered workers are reported by major bargaining unit in 
Table 3.2. Employees are organized by bargaining unit. There are some non-bargaining unit 
employees in each bargaining unit. These would be typically managers and certain other staff 
that are not eligible for collcctive bargaining. The clerical unit was not organized until 1985. 
Table 3.2 - Averages by Major Bargaining Unit for Iowa State Government 
Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining, 1981-1992 
Clerical Technical Blue 
Collar 
Fiscal and 
Staff 
Social 
Services 
Security Public 
Safety 
Member 0.159 0.347 0.347 0.154 0.382 0.531 0.933 
Exit* 0.078 0.078 0.074 0.077 0.083 0.085 0.035 
New Entrant 0.092 0.076 0.066 0.079 0.074 0.112 0.041 
dioOlinfmum Wage) 0.046 0.053 0.049 0.044 0.055 0.049 0.057 
dlofWage) 0.082 0.076 0.065 0.079 0.075 0.072 0.066 
dln(CPS age) 0.038 0.046 0.035 0.053 0.037 0.045 0.049 
InfNN age )t-l 6.384 6.493 6.397 6.837 6.653 6.575 6.813 
ln(CPS ^^'agc)|.l 6.384 6.333 6.307 6.849 6.362 6.626 6.689 
Pay Step 1.163 1.151 1.130 1.156 1.141 1.131 1.221 
dln( FTE) 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
Over time Indicator 0.356 0.548 0.720 0.067 0.030 0.797 0.130 
Dues 161.353 176.697 168.823 199.411 140.471 188.423 114.827 
Total Dues /1,000 69.381 247.095 167.539 40.724 53.220 137.883 56.507 
State Tenure 8.955 10.586 10.751 10.054 9.398 7.529 13.820 
Prior Experience 15.687 12.081 15.304 14.217 13.239 14.774 7.544 
Part 11me 0.072 0.020 0.028 0.010 0.028 0.006 0.000 
Non-White 0.069 0.038 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.044 0.018 
Female 0.963 0.541 0.203 0.367 0.718 0.096 0.040 
Married 0.570 0.610 0.720 0.615 0.632 0.724 0.801 
Professional 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.916 0.620 0.005 0.157 
Teciiaical 0.000 0.327 0.177 0.054 0.000 0.134 0.038 
Clerical 0.998 0.186 0.053 0.030 0.372 0.004 0.000 
Ser\ice/Blue Collar 0.001 0.476 0.770 0.000 0.007 0.857 0.804 
n 21.983 46.830 34.350 13.726 20.050 15.844 6.279 
• The variable Exit only has values for employees in 1981 to 1991 since 1992 is the final year of data. 
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Also, the social services bargaining unit was not organized in 1983. Prior to that year, they 
were represented by AFSCME. The AFSCME union was de-certified and the United 
Professional union was certified in 1984. 
3.3 Definition of Variables 
The definition of the variables used to model union membership and quits are listed 
below: 
Member - Equals 1 if union member and zero otherwise 
Exit - Equals 1 if worker exits the state labor force at time /+/ and zero otherwise. 
New Entrant - Equals 1 if the employee has less than one year of tenure and zero 
otherwise. 
Collective Bargaining - Equals 1 if the employee is covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement and zero otherwise. 
dln(Miniinum Wage) - Log change in minimum biweekly wage for the employee's 
job (five-digit job code) between time i and t-1. If Minimum Wage is missing the 
statewide average of ln(Minimum Wage) for the aggregate job classification is 
used. 
dln(Wage) - Log change in the employees biweekly wage between time t  and i - I .  If 
the Wage is missing the statewide average of dln( Wage) for the aggregate job 
classification is used. 
dln(CPS Wage) - Log change in the biweekly wage for the relevant job in the CPS 
data. If the CPS Wage is missing the statewide average of dln(CPS Wage)for the 
aggregate job classification is used. 
dln(Wage) - dln(!V1in Wage) - dln(Wage) - dln(Minimum Wage) 
dln(Min Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) - dln(Minimum Wage) - dIn(CPS Wage) 
dln(Relative Wage) - dln(Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) 
ln(Relative Wage) - In(wage) - ln(CPS Wage) 
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ln(Wage),-i - Log of the biweekly wage at /-/. If the Wage,.i is missing the statewide 
average of ln(VVage),.i for the aggregate job classification is used. 
ln(CPS Wage)i-i - Log of biweekly wage for the relevant occupation in the CPS at i-
]. If the CPS wage is missing the statewide average of ln(CPS Wage) for the 
aggregate job classification is used. 
Pay Step - Equals the ratio of the Wage to the Minimum Wage. If either Wage or 
the Minimum Wage is missing, the statewide average of Pay Step for the 
aggregate job classification is used. 
Dues - Annual dues contribution required for union membership, deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
Total Dues /1,000 - Total contribution, in thousands of dollars, of all others in the 
bargaining unit. 
dln( PTE) -Log change in the number of PTE's in the aggregate occupation 
category. 
Over time Indicator - Equals I if the worker had overtime hours and zero 
otherwise. 
Prior Experience - Number of years between age 18 and date of employment with 
the state 
State Tenure - Number of years of employment with the state 
Part Time - Equals 1 if the employee is part-time or seasonal. Part time is defined 
to include permanent and exempt part-time, intermittent, seasonal and temporary 
unauthorized positions. 
Non-White - Equals 1 if the employee is a minority and zero otherwise. Minority 
includes Black. Asian. American Indian, and Hispanic individuals. 
Female - Equals 1 if the employee is a female and zero otherwise. 
Married - Equals 1 if the employee is married and zero otherwise. 
Manager - Equals 1 if the employee's aggregate job classification is a manager and 
zero otherwise. 
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Professional - Equals 1 if the employee s aggregate job classification is a 
professional occupation and zero otherwise. 
Technical - Equals 1 if the employee's aggregate job classification is a technical 
occupation and zero otherwise. 
Clerical - Equals 1 if the employees aggregate job classification is a clerical 
occupation and zero otherwise. 
Service/Blue Collar - Equals 1 if the employee's aggregate job classification is a 
scrvicc or blue collar occupation and zero otherwise. 
D82- Equals if 1982 and zero otherwise. 
D83 - Equals if 1983 and zero otherwise. 
D84- Equals if 1984 and zero otherwise. 
D85- Equals if 1985 and zero otherwise. 
D86- Equals if 1986 and zero otherwise. 
D87- Equals if 1987 and zero otherwise. 
D88- Equals if 1988 and zero otherwise. 
D89- Equals if 1989 and zero otherwise. 
D90- Equals if 1990 and zero otherwise. 
D91 - Equals if 1991 and zero otherwise. 
D92- Equals if 1992 and zero otherwise. 
Chapter 4 defines which variables are used to model union membership. Chapter 5 
defines the subset that is used to model quits. In both instances, descriptive statistics arc 
reported. 
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CHAPTER 4 - EMPIRICAL MODEL OF UNIION MEMBERSHIP 
4.1 Introduction 
Observing preferences for unions is complicated by the fact that the choice of union 
versus non-union status is often made simultaneously with the choice of occupation or job. 
However, workers covered by collective bargaining contracts in the public sector and in 
"Right to Work" states are usually not required to pay union dues. The payroll data for Iowa 
state employees provides an opportunity to observe workers' preferences for union services 
via voluntary dues contributions. Workers clearly have the opportunity to (and do) change 
union status at any time without affecting their current job status. Thus, we can treat the 
workers choice of occupation at time t as exogenous to the union membership decision at time 
t+n .  
It is possible that an individual will join the public sector labor force because it is 
organized. However, once employed in the public sector, the individual can make the choice 
of whether or not to be a union member each subsequent period. The only cost in change 
from union to non-union status, other than the dues, is filling out a form to start or stop the 
withholding of dues from the individual's biweekly check. However, changing sectors of 
employment has much greater cost of search, lost seniority, and lost specific human capital. 
Thus, this temporal separation of occupational and union choices provides the necessary 
identifying assumption for the estimation of the demand for union services. 
Union membership is examined conditional on the worker being covered by a 
collective bargaining contract. The process of allocating workers into covered and non-
covered jobs is thus ignored. Later, the selection process into state employment will be 
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explicitly modeled. This will be done by modeling the decision to remain in a public sector job 
or to exit for employment elsewhere. 
4.2 Empirical Model 
Assume that each agent is maximizing utility, f, at time / by choosing membership 
status, m, given a set x, of exogenous and predetermined factors and a random disturbance 
Each agent is free to choose the membership status that maximizes his utility.is observed by 
the agent, but is not observable to the econometrician. Employment at time / is not 
conditional on membership in the union. However, membership could conceivably afifect 
future employment and earnings. Thus, we can identify the probability that a given individual 
chooses to pay dues and become a union member in the following manner 
Let f ] /  = V(m=l,x„u) be the utility derived by the ith individual if he pays dues and 
becomes a union member. Let V,o = V(m=0,x„uj be the utility derived by individual / if he 
does not join the union. Then we can define the difference in utility between the two different 
states as 
where 2 is a vector of associated parameters. 
A rational agent will choose m=/ if and only if > 0. Otherwise, the agent will 
choose m=0 and free ride on the union services provided. Given . i ~ N(0,1), the probability 
that individual / is a union member is 
a/ = V(m = I,x„uJ - V(m=0,x„uj = x,2 ~ : (4.1) 
(4.2) 
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where <|) is the normal density function and O is the normal distribution function. The 
parameters. have a direct relationship to the change in the expected value of membership. 
The calculation of the marginal effect of variable .v, on the expected value of membership. P 
is 
dp 
= ^x/J)j3j. (4.3) 
C.Xj 
The elasticity is calculated as 
Cj = (4.4A) 
^ 0(.v/7) 
for nontransformed variables. The elasticity for a variable in log form is 
e , =  f 4 . 4 B j  
^ 0(.v/7) 
The union may provide many services, but two of the most important are to negotiate 
for u age increases and job security. We can measure unions' ser\'ices in terms of wage and 
employment changes'. These changes may be common across all jobs, so that the union 
services are public goods and consumed by all workers covered by the agreement. 
Conversely, a portion of the union services can be private goods, so that the wage and 
employment changes benefit only a subset of the covered workers. 
Now define the following components of.v as 
.duv - Percentage wage increase due to collective bargain for individual i in reference 
group k. 
Other public goods such as grievance procedures, working conditions, seniority rules arc also provided by the union. 
However, these have spillover effects to non-bargaining unit employees also. These components are not specifically 
modeled but should affect workers' marginal valuation of union services. 
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Awl - Average percentage wage increase due to collective bargaining for individuals in 
reference group k. 
Aw.p - Percentage increase in individual /'s opportunity wage. 
- Percentage change in employment for individual i in group k. 
Aei - Percentage change in total employment in group k. 
D,i - Annual dues required for the /th individual to be a union member of group k. 
D.,k - Annual dues contributions of other individuals in reference group k. 
The public gains from collective bargaining can be measured by Awi - Awp and Aci. 
The gain in pay relative to private sector pay yields distinct benefits to workers. The union 
has no direct eflfect on employment growth'" but does provide benefits if jobs are threatened. 
Therefore, there will be a greater demand for union services when Ae^ < 0. The private gains 
from collective bargaining for individual i can be expressed as Awn - Awk and Aen - Aei. 
These factors measure changes in wages and employment for the Ath job relative to state 
employees as a whole. Da is the amount of dues or the price the union charges that individual 
to be a member. Using a revealed preference argument, those who are dues paying members 
arc "willing to pay" at least Ai for the union services. They are "voting" for an expansion of 
union services and are getting at least D.i in benefit from the increase in resources to the 
union. 
Now define the remaining elements ofx as x,,. Then xfi in equation (4.2) can be 
written as 
The unions bargain over wage levels and noi employment levels. 
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The parameter values in this specification reflect the degree of publicness of union services 
and specifically whether the public good and/or private good aspects of union services are 
driving membership. The total instantaneous wage service effect is related to fit and ftz and 
the total employment service effect is related to Ps and /?/ and Ps reflect the private good 
effects of union ser\'ices on membership. Likewise. P2 and reflect the public good effects of 
union servnces. If P:>0 and P4 ^ then union wage and employment services would 
be treated only as public goods. At the other extreme, if Pi =P: and Py=P4 then union service 
would be valued only as private goods. The more likely case is that the union's wage and 
employment services have some public and some private good aspects. 
The effect of own contributions and others' contributions are modeled as a linear 
technology. /?5 is related to average willingness to pay at the margin. As union dues increase 
or the contributions of other increase, fewer individuals will choose to contribute to the union. 
The parameter y reflects the substitutability of others'contributions for their own 
contributions. In the case of a purely private good, y is zero. When union services are a pure 
public good y is equal to one. The joint product model implies y will lie between zero and 
one. 
The parameter (5^ provides some information about how the union might be behaving. 
Revenue maximization would suggest that the observed equilibrium should be such that 
demand is unitary price elastic. This could arise if the union was providing a pure public 
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good". This implies that union dues, in equilibrium, would be set such that membership is 
unitary elastic. We would cxpect to see a profit maximizing union setting dues such that the 
equilibrium occurs on the clastic portion of the union demand curve. Given that only one 
union represents any particular group of workers, unions have a monopoly on the provision of 
services, at least in the short run. 
Median voter models have been used to model union determination and provision of 
services. In eases where dues paying is required, it s reasonable that the dues rate might 
reflect the marginal valuation of the median member. However, when membership is not 
required, the situation is different. The median worker has the ability to free ride as long as 
some portions of the services provided are public goods. Thus, the median worker may vote 
for union representation but not for the expansion of union services. This of course assumes 
that the services the union is able to provide are a function of the collective resources 
contributed. If in fact the ability- to bargain is afTected by the membership rate, the median 
voter may want the union to maximize membership or at least go beyond the point where total 
dues contributions are maximized. At any rate, the model being developed assumes that it is 
resources rather than solidarity that determines the services that the union can provide. 
To the extent that contributions of others arc substitutes for their own contributions, the 
likelihood of becoming a dues paying member should decrease as the contributions of others 
increase. The pure public good scenario implies that raising the contribution of others would, 
ignoring budget effects, have the same impact on membership as an increase in the dues rate. 
As union services becomc more rival in consumption, workers will value the contribution of 
" The marginal costs of allowing additional covcred workers to join would be zero if the services were a pure public good. 
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others less. For the limiting case of a pure private good, the contributions of others would 
not affect the decision to pay union dues. 
4.3 Data 
Payroll data from the Iowa state government is used to identify the public and private 
cffects of union scrviccs. This data contains annual observations on Iowa state employees 
from 1980 to 1992. Included in the data is information about the union status of an 
indi\aduai. Thus, we can determine if the individual's job is covered by a collective bargaining 
contract and if dues are being voluntarily withheld from individual's biweekly paycheck. Table 
4.1 provides descriptive statistics and definitions for employees covered by collective 
bargaining during the sample period 1982 to 1992. The first two years are not used because 
of an inconsistency in how dues paying was coded in the data. 
Information is also provided on the amount of dues that are A\'ithheld. Some of the 
unions, such as the one representing the troopers, had dues that were constant across all jobs 
for a given year. However, for the AFSCME union, each local was allowed to have its own 
dues structure. Some locals had constant dollar amounts for all members. Others had dues 
that arc set proportional to salary. Each local had an opportunity to adjust its pricing 
structure on an annual basis. Many of the locals changed their dues structure frequently 
during the 11 year period. The only constraint on local dues setting is the amount that must 
be collected to cover dues for the national organization. 
In addition to each worker's actual biweekly pay, the minimum and maximum salaries 
for the job title are included. Public good wage increases are identified using year to year 
changcs in the log of the minimum wage for the job title. The wage increase for an individual 
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Table 4.1 - Covered Iowa State Employees: Variable Definitions and Descriptive 
Statistics, 1982-1992 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Member I if union member 0.352 0.477 
dln(Minimuni Wage) Log ctiangc in minimum biweekly wage for ihc 0.046 0.041 
employee's job 
dln(Wage) Log changc in ihe employee's biweekly wage 0.072 0.118 
dln(CPS Wage) Log change in the biweekly wage for (he relevant job in 0.042 0.044 
the CPS data 
dln(\Vagc) - dln(Min Wage) dln(Wage) - dln(Minimum Wage) 0.026 0.113 
dln(Vlin Wage) - dlii(CPS aln(Minimum Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) 0.003 0.060 
Wage) 
dln(Relative Wage) dIn(Wagc( - dln(CPS Wage) 0.622 0.037 
ln(Rciativc Wage) In(wagc) - ln(CPS Wage) 0.770 0.019 
ln(Wage)t-l Log of the biweekly wage ai t-1 6.550 0.294 
ln{CPS Wage)i.i Log of biweekly wage for the relevant occupation in the 6.445 0.299 
CPS at t-1 
Pay Step Ratio of the actual biweekly wage to the minimum 1.150 0.094 
biweekly wage 
Dues Dues contribution required for union membership 169.962 34.746 
Total Dues /l.OOO Total contribution, in thousands of dollars, of all others 146.780 94.657 
m the bargaining unit 
dln( FTE) Log change in the number of PTEs in the aggregate 
-0.002 0.035 
occupation category 
Over time Indicator 1 if the worker had overtime hours 0.462 0.499 
Prior Experience Number of years between age 1X and einploymeni with 13.686 9.780 
the state 
State Tenure Number of years of employment with the state 10.112 7.865 
Part Time 1 if the employee is part-time or seasonal 0.028 0.164 
Non-White 1 if the employee is a tninority 0.044 0.205 
Female 1 if the employee is a female 0.476 0.499 
Married 1 if the employee is married 0.649 0.477 
Professional 1 if the employee has a professional occupation 0.166 0.372 
I'echnlcal I if the employee has a technical occupation 0.152 0.359 
Clerical 1 if the employee has a clerical occupation 0.263 0.440 
Ser\ice/Bluc Collar 1 if the employee has a service or blue collar occupation 0.419 0.493 
D82 1 if 1982 0.075 0.264 
D83 I if 1983 0.063 0.244 
D84 1 if 1984 0.076 0.265 
D8S I if 1985 0.096 0.295 
D86 1 if 1986 0.092 0.289 
D87 1 if 1987 0.096 0.295 
D88 1 if 1988 0.097 0.295 
D89 1 if 1989 0.104 0.305 
D90 1 if 1990 0.105 0.306 
D9I 1 if 1991 0.099 0.299 
D92 1 if 1992 0.096 0.294 
n =148,009 
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is measured by the year to year change in the log of the actual biweekly wage. This includes 
changes in the individual salary that occur bccausc of promotions or other occupational 
changes. The difference between the actual wage increase and the increase in the minimum 
salary measures the private good wage increase. The increase to the salary scale and the total 
wage increase that an individual receives are not necessarily equal. As is typical in public 
sector wage schedules, there is a series of pay steps within each pay plan that the workers 
receive based how long they have been in a specific job. Workers wages may also be 
changing due being promoted to higher paying jobs. 
The level and rate of change of wages outside the state government labor market is 
derived from wage information contained in the March Current Population Survey. The 
March Survey contains wage information for detailed occupations. The log change in CPS 
wage for the occupation closest to the defined job for a public sector employee is used as an 
estimate of the employee's opportunity wage increase in the private labor market. 
There is evidence that the wage effects can be identified. A considerable amount of 
intertemporal variation exists in the union's ability to secure wage increases. The data 
includes years of zero, moderate and large overall wage increases. During years where wage 
freezes arc imposed, any change in an individual's pay is a private good (the public wage 
increase is zero.) In addition, comparable worth adjustments allow cross sectional effects of 
public wage increases to be identified.'" Comparable worth adjustment provided exogenous 
shocks to relative wages in two separate years (1985 and 1987). These changes in relative 
wages not only occurred across the broad occupational categories but also created substantial 
'• Manila. Orazcm and Turk (1999) use the comparable worth wage shocks to estimate an input demand system for stale 
government. 
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changcs in relative wages within each occupational category. Some jobs received as many as 
seven pay grade increases as a result of comparable worth, while other jobs received no 
increases. In addition, private wage gains also varied substantially. 
4.4 Model Estimates 
Three different specifications of the model are estimated. The specifications differ in 
tlic ways that wage increases influence the perceived benefits from being a union member. 
The first specification allows absolute wage changes to drive membership. That is, the 
log change in actual wage, minimum wage and the private sector wage each enter the 
membership function. This specification allows for changes in wage differentials that comc 
fi-om external (private sector) forces to have a different effect than internal (state) movement 
in wages. 
The second specification is based on equation 4.6. The private gain is measured by the 
diffcrcncc between the minimum wage gain and the actual wage gain for each individual. The 
public wage gain is the amount of salary increase in the salary scale over and above the private 
scctor wage increase for the specific job. This specification isolates the public and private 
wage increases. 
The third specification ftirther constrains the wage effect such that only the changc in 
the relative wage of the state versus the private sector is important in the membership 
decision. 
The parameter estimates for each model arc estimated via the method of maximum 
likelihood. Table 4.2 contains the parameter estimates for the three different specifications. 
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The calculatcd elasticities are reported in Table 4.3. The marginal effects and the 
elasticities arc evaluated at the overall averages of each independent variable. 
The estimates are quite similar in the three specifications. Similar results exist for the 
cffccts of public and private wage changes. While the estimated parameter for dlnfCPS 
fVage) is not statistically significant, imposing the restrictions of the of the Public/Private 
Wage Gain Model is rejected (Likelihood ration = 547.) The positive coefficients on 
dln(Minimum Salary) and dln(Wage) suggest that, in the short run. both individual and overall 
wage gains increase membership. Both parameters are significantly different from zero and 
thus not consistent with a wage services being provided a purely public or purely private 
goods. Membership seems to be more responsive to wage services that arc more individual 
specific. This is supported by the absolute wage gain specification and the public private 
wage gain specifications. Both specifications suggest a more clastic membership response to 
individual specific wage gains than to across the board wage changes. This suggests that an 
exclusion mechanism for wage services will increase membership. This result seems to run 
counter to the tendency for unions to reduce the variation in wages and other differences 
between occupations. The difference in the magnitude of the estimated parameters for 
dln(Wage) and dln(Minimum Salary) suggests that membership will be increased more with 
individual wage gains as opposed to across the board increases. 
The wage growth (dln(CPS Wage)) in the private sector has a positive but 
insignificant influence on membership. This suggests that any differences in external wage 
across occupations arc not important in the membership decision. The annual dummies are 
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Table 4.2 - Union Demand Model Estimates 
Variable Absolute Wage Gain 
Model 
Public/Private Wage 
Gain Model 
Relative Wage Gain 
Model 
rp/rx r p / f x  rp/cx 
dln(Minimuin Wage) 
dln(Wage) 
dln(CPS Wage) 
dln(\Vagc) - dln(IV1in 
Wage) 
dln(Min Wage) - dln(CPS 
Wage) 
dln(Relative Wage) 
ln(RelaHve Wage) 
ln(Wage),.i 
ln(CPS Wage),.I 
Pay Step 
Dues 
Total Dues/ 1000 
7 
dln( FTE) 
Overtime indicator 
Prior Experience 
State Tenure 
Log Likelihood 
1.3960 
(0.1197) 
1.8232 
(0.0469) 
0.0751' 
(0.0874) 
1.9321 
(0.0308) 
-0.4906 
(0.0196) 
0.3283 
(0.0596) 
-0.0046 
(0.0001) 
-0.0011 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
0.1831* 
(0.3050) 
0.0857 
(0.0085) 
-0.0026 
(0.0004) 
-0.0103 
(0.0006) 
-85176.4 
0.5083 
0.6639 
0.0274 
0.7036 
-0.1786 
0.1196 
-0.0017 
-0.0004 
0.0667 
0.0312 
-0.0009 
-0.0038 
1.7402 
(0.0465) 
1.0648 
(0.0736) 
1.9035 
(0.0307) 
-0.5186 
(0.0196) 
0.3167 
(0.0595) 
-0.0043 
(0.0001) 
-0.00 II 
(0.0001) 
0.0003 
-0.1658" 
(0.3040) 
0.0823 
(0.0085) 
-0.0029 
(0.0004) 
-0.0104 
(0.0006) 
-85449.9 
0.6338 
0.3878 
0.6932 
-0.1889 
0.1153 
-0.0016 
-0.0004 
-0.0604 
0.0300 
-0.0011 
-0.0038 
0.6219 
(0.0369) 
0.7701 
(0.0187) 
1.3604 
(0.0548) 
-0.0030 
(O.OOOL) 
-0.0015 
(0.0001) 
0.0005 
-0.2066' 
(0.3020) 
0.0713 
(0.0084) 
-0.0045 
(0.0004) 
-0.0087 
(0.0006) 
-86562.3 
0.2265 
0.2805 
0.4956 
-0.0011 
-0.0006 
-0.0753 
0.0260 
-0.0016 
-0.0032 
* Indicates not significant at the .05 le\'el. Standard errors arc liaed in parentheses. Marginal effects are computed using the overall average 
for each x 
Table 4.2(cont.) 
Variable Absolute Wage Public and Relative Wage 
Gain Model Private Wage Gain Model 
Gain Model 
P rp/rx fi rp/tx P rp/?x 
Part Time -0.4823 -0.1756 -0.4892 -0.1782 -0.5755 -0.2096 
(0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0264) 
Non-White 0.1026 0.0373 0.0995 0.0362 0.0878 0.0320 
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
Female 0.1592 0.0580 0.1635 0.0595 0.0251 0.0091 (o.oom (0.0088) (0.0083) 
Married -0.0327 -0.0119 -0.0315 -0.0115 -0.0158 -0.0058 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0075) 
Technical 0.5309 0.1933 0.5157 0.1878 0.3261 0.1188 
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0175) 
Clerical 0.1778 0.0647 0.1468 0.0535 -0.2574 -0.0938 
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0137) 
Ser\icc/Bluc Collar 1.2152 0.4425 1.1972 0.4360 0.7951 0.2897 
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0147) 
Intercept -10.1604 -9.5470 -1.1825 
(0.1922) (0.1899) (0.0653) 
Dg2 -0.0113* -0.0041 -0.0738 -0.0269 -0.6610 -0.2408 
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0221) 
D83 0.1534 0.0559 -0.0289' -0.0105 -0.5911 -0.2153 
(0.0270) (0.0258) (0.0217) 
D84 0.0041' 0.0015 -0.0935 -0.0340 -0.5932 -0.2161 
(0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0238) 
D85 -0.0343' -0.0125 -0.0907 -0.0330 -0.5145 -0.1874 
(0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0204) 
D86 0.0596 0.0217 -0.1398 -0.0509 -0.5081 -0.1851 
(0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0171) 
D87 -0.0319' -0.0116 -0.0717 -0.0261 -0.3879 -0.1413 
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0267) 
D88 0.0574 0.0209 -0.0281* -0.0102 -0.2735 -0.0996 
(0.0218) (0.0214) (0.0206) 
D89 -0.0357* -0.0130 -0.1066 -0.0388 -0.2913 -0.1061 
(0.0307) (0.0304) (0.0298) 
D90 -0.0526 -0.0192 -0.1287 -0.0469 -0.2319 -0.0845 
(0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0195) 
D91 0.1494 0.0544 -0.0536 -0.0195 -0.0982 -0.0358 
(0.0196) (0.0175) (0.0168) 
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Table 4.3 - Calculated Elasticities 
Absolute Wage 
Gain Model 
Public and 
Private Wage 
Gain Model 
Relative Wage 
Gain Model 
dln(Minimufn Wage) 1.52 
din(Wage) 1.98 
dln(CPS Wage) 0.08 
dInCWage) - dln(Mia Wage) 1.89 
dln(IVlin Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) 1.16 
dln(Rciativc Wage) 0.68 
ln(Relativc Wage) 0.84 
In(Wage),., 2.10 2.07 
ln(CPS Wage)i.i -0.53 -0.56 
Pay Step 0.41 0.40 1.70 
Dues -0.84 -0.80 -0.56 
Total Dues x 1000 -0.17 -0.18 -0.24 
dln( FTE) 0.20 -0.18 -0.22 
capturing the general rate of wage inflation in the private sector. Thus, the absolute wage 
gain model may be over-parameterized. 
dln(FTE) has an insignificant influence on union membership and the sign changes 
depending on the specification. Thus, we can't reject the hypothesis that changes in aggregate 
employment levels for the workers' occupational classification have no effect on union 
membership. This suggests that differences in private job security across job types arc not 
important. That is not to say that overall job security is not a factor in the union membership 
decision. Because I have included annual dummy variables in each of the models. I have 
controlled for overall changes in state employment. It may well be that dln(FTE) does not 
accurately capture private job security effects or is dominated by statewide public job security 
cffects. 
Wage levels have a strong positive influence on membership, which is consistent 
across the all the models estimated. ln(Actual Salary),.i is positively related to union 
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membership. The absolute wage model and the public/private wage gain models both have an 
estimated elasticity of greater than 2. In all specifications, membership is positively related to 
relative wages. This relationship appears to be elastic in the absolute wage gain and the 
public/private wage gain models. Membership response is positive but inelastic in the relative 
wage gain model. The elasticity associated with dln(Relative Wage) is approximately equal to 
the diflferencc between the public and private good wage elasticities. 
The opportunity wage for the jobs outside state government tlnfCPS IVage),./) has a 
negative influence on membership. The higher the opportunity wage the more likely the 
individual is to be a free-rider. This is consistent with theory. If a worker feels he is 
underpaid relative to what he could make outside state government, he will be less likely to be 
a union member. Workers in jobs that enjoy a smaller wage differential over private sector 
counterparts may not have benefited as much from past union bargaining and may be 
pessimistic about the ability of the union to bargain for wage increases. More importantly, 
they would be more inclined to exit state government employment. All these factors should 
contribute to this result. 
Pay Step measures an indiNidual's current pay relative to the minimum salary for their 
respective job. The estimated parameter associated with Pay Step indicates that those 
workers at the upper end of the wage distributions for their individual job are more likely to 
be union members. These individuals arc more likely to have exhausted step increases. Thus, 
the only mechanism for wage increases would be from general pay increases that could come 
from union bargaining. More recently promoted workers tend to be at the lower pay steps. 
When workers advance to a job with a higher pay grade, they usually enter that grade at a 
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lower step. However, this effect may be exacerbated by the higher turnover rates for less 
senior workers. 
The level of dues or cost of membership has a negative impact on membership in all 
cases.The price effcct in Public/Private Wage Gain and Absolute Wage Gain specification 
arc almost identical. The estimates suggest that a one-dollar increase in dues rate will cause a 
likelihood of membership to decrease by about .0016. The estimated coefficient for Dues in 
the Relative Wage Gain Model is similar to the other two specifications. In this case, an 
increase in dues would correspond to a .0011 decrease in likelihood of membership. This 
suggests that the estimated effect of dues is robust across the three specifications. 
The calculated price elasticities (Table 4.3) indicate that overall union membership is 
price inelastic. Revenue maximization would suggest that, in equilibrium, demand would be 
unitary' elastic. Based on this, the union may also be considering membership rate when 
setting dues. An alternative scenario might be where there is an uncoordinated supply of 
union services and myopic locals set dues given the demand and cost structure facing them. 
However, this is not consistent with the short run monopoly power unions have in providing 
collective bargain services. 
The estimated y is simply the ratio of the estimated parameter for Total dues/1000 and 
Dues. This value is negative and statistically different from zero. Recall in the joint product 
model developed in Chapter 2 that their own contributions as well as the contributions of 
others enter the utility fiinction. Thus, y measures the degree to which contributions of others 
" Models with interaction terms between the occupational dummies and the dues raic were also estimated. When the 
pricc response is allowed to var>' across aggregate job types, only technical occupations had a positive coefTicient. The 
coetTicients for the other three occupation categories are all negative and close in magnitude. 
can substitute for own contributions. In the ease of a pure public good they would be perfect 
substitutes. The estimates of 7 reported in Table 4.2 support the joint product model. The 
share parameter. 7, ranges from .0002 to .0005. The null hypothesis that 7 0 is equivalent to 
testing that the coefficient for Total dues/1000 is equal to zero. The calculated Wald statistic 
is 372 in the Absolute Wage Gain Model. 390 for the public private wages gain model and 
720 for the Relative Wage Gain model estiiriatcs. TTiese values are significant at any 
reasonable level. Whiles the values for 7 arc statistically significant, they arc fairly small. This 
suggest that union membership is predominately a private good. If this is in fact the case, 
union security clauses aren\ necessary to deal with free-riders. 
While these estimates may be the first to quantify the relative importance of public and 
private aspects of union membership, this is not the first attempt to model the demand for 
public good with an impure public good. Many researchers have attempted to quantify the 
publicness of services provided by local governments''*. In most cases, the research models 
demand in the context of the median voter. As such, the median voter's demand is modeled as 
a function of the per unit price of the public good. r.V'". In this model i is the tax rate. N is the 
population size and 7 is the congestion parameter. In this case. 7 equal 1 implies that it is a 
public good and y equal to zero implies that is a private good. In many cases, the empirical 
estimates derived from data have yielded estimates of congestion parameters that are greater 
than one and thus not consistent with the model. 
One issue that has been thus far ignored is the influence of selection bias. Individuals 
are sclf-selccting in and out of state employment. It is quite likely that those individuals that 
'•* Sec for example Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982). Edwards (1986). Bcrchcrding and Deacon (1972). and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) 
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arc most likely to leave state employment would also be less likely to be union members. 
They may be less likely to be union members not because they have less of a demand for union 
scr\-iccs. but because they have less of a chance of remaining in their currcnt position. This 
would tend to bias downward the estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for union 
services. This issue will be addressed in the next chapter. 
State tenure is negatively related to union membership in each of the specifications. 
Tenure before entering state employment (Prior Experience) is also negatively related to union 
membership. This could be due to an overall age effect. Farbcr and Saks (1980) found older 
workers were less likely to vote for union representation. Presumably, older workers have 
fewer years remaining to benefit from investing in the union. However, a likelihood ratio test 
with the null hypothesis that the coeflFicients on State Tenure and Prior Experience arc equal is 
rejected. This suggests that tenure with state government has a different effect on union 
membership. Individuals' prior experience may come from all of the three following source; 
years spent in formal education, years spent in the labor force outside of state government, 
and time spent out of the labor force. This confounds the measurement slightly. Individuals 
with more tenure prior to entering state government would be older than others in their cohort 
and arc likely to have more non-specific experience. Tenure with state employment is a 
clcaner measure and thus has a more straightforward interpretation. The magnitude of Slate 
Tenure is greater (more negative) than that of Prior Experience suggesting that firm specific 
experience has a larger negative impact on union demand. 
The negative relationship seems at first surprising given that new and younger workers 
would rcccive fewer benefits from the union. Most of the exits from the public sector come 
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from workers with very little tenure. Therefore, the presumption would be that the group of 
low-tenure workers would disproportionately include workers with little future interest in 
public sector pay growth and working conditions. Thus, selection bias would tend to bias the 
coefficient on Prior Experience and Stale Tenure toward the positive. 
However, it is possible that as tenure increases incentives to invest in union 
membership decline. Tenure plays an important role in the services that the unions provide. 
As a worker gains state-specific experience, seniority rules tend to insulate the workers from 
the adverse effects of potential employment shocks. These rules apply to all covered workers 
regardless of membership, and so free riders cannot be excluded. These services would be 
viewed as more public, the more seniority the worker has. 
Full time, non-white, female and single employees are each more likely to be union 
members. Previous research has generated mixed results of the impact of gender on the 
demand for union services. Some studies have argued that females tend to be less likely to be 
union members. Many have argued that it is due to less attachment to the labor force. Farber 
and Saks (1980) found positive but insignificant effects of gender. Chaison and Dhavale 
(1992) found that females were less likely to be union members. Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
find that while women are less likely to be union members, they are more likely to vote for 
unionization in elections. I would argue that limited wage information in other studies has 
precluded researchers from disentangling wage effects from other effects and this has led to 
mixed results. The resuhs here suggest that females have higher marginal valuation of union 
membership and that wages are driving the empirical result that on average, women have 
lower rates of membership. Granted, one cannot make inferences about unions as a whole 
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based on data in Iowa. However, the large relative wage changes induced by comparable 
worth should allow us to unravel wage effects from other fixed effects. 
The occupational dummy variables indicate that Service/Blue Collar workers have the 
highest marginal valuation of union services and Professional employees have the lowest. 
Technical workers have greater interest in membership than do Clerical. Other studies 
suggest that unions tend to benefit low wage and lower skilled workers the most and thus 
narrow the size of the skilled/unskilled wage differentials. For instance, Farber and Saks 
(1980) found that workers on the lower end of the wage distribution were more likely to vote 
for union representation. The service/blue collar jobs in general tend to have higher union 
rates in the private market. Professional type jobs are more likely to have professional 
associations and not have collective bargaining. Clerical workers tend to have very low rates 
of unionization. They also tend to be at the lower end of the wage distribution, but this is 
controlled for in the model. 
Non-white employees are significantly more likely to pay union dues. Presumably, 
minority workers place a higher value on union services, because they feel that collective 
bargaining and grievance procedures will help to protect them from race discrimination. This 
result is consistent with the results of numerous other studies'^. 
The annual dummies are included to control for overall employment effects and any 
other macro economic effects. The dummies reflcct the fact that there was a dramatic 
upswing in membership in the last half of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. Part 
of this could be due to an unmeasured effect of comparable worth. Part of this could also be 
Sec for example. Farber and Saks (1980). Farber (1983). Chaison and Dhavalc (1992). Davis and iiusion (1995). and 
Sobcl (1995). 
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due to a standoff between unions and the governor over wage increases that the unions had 
negotiated but were not given because of unexpected budget shortfalls. The union ultimately 
won the wage increases; however, this induced layoffs. Even though the total reduction in 
employment was small, a large number of workers were shifted to different jobs due to 
seniority rules and bumping rights. One would expect that this would increase an individual's 
desire for union representation, because it is more likely that the worker would be using 
grievance procedures. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Wages play an important role in determining union membership, especially the ability 
of unions to secure wage increases and historical wage differentials between the public and 
private sectors. Current wage gains by state employees and historical wage differentials have 
a strong positive influence on the perceived benefit from union membership. A wage increase 
that is less widely enjoyed elicits a stronger membership response. 
Membership also responds significantly to the price of membership or the dues. The 
elasticity suggests that the union is pricing on the inelastic portion of the demand curve. It 
would seem that union revenue could be increased by increasing the dues rate. However, I 
only observe membership conditional on the choice to remain in state government. Factors 
that effect the marginal evaluation of union service also affect tenure. Thus, there is the 
potential for selection bias to influence the results. An empirical model of quits is developed 
in the next chapter. This model is used to create statistical controls for the potential selection 
bias. Oncc the selection bias has been accounted for. the model estimates will be examined. I 
will then quantify the impact of comparable worth on our ability to identify the model 
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parameter. In addition, the model will be used to explore the impact of comparable on both 
quits and on union membership. 
The contributions of others also have a negative effect on membership, suggesting a 
joint production of a public and private good. The magnitude of the congestion parameter 
suggests that union services are for the most part a private good. 
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CHAPTER 5 - PUBLIC SECTOR QUITS 
5.1 introduction 
Both employer and employees bear costs when employment relationships are severed. 
Both invest in the creation of the job match through search costs and investment in firm 
specific human capital. These investments are foregone when the worker quits or is laid off. 
Asymmetric information or other information imperfections may be partly to blame. Some 
information about job characteristics and potential employees is not revealed fiilly to all parties 
until after employment. Once worker productivity becomes known, the employer and/or 
worker may find that their welfare can be improved if they terminate the relationship. 
Alternatively, new information may reveal that the worker is more productive than 
anticipated. In that case, employers may be able to reduce turnover by offering higher wages 
to reducc quits. Higher wages may also allow them to be more selective in the hiring process. 
Labor market tenure is determined by many factors such as opportunity wages, job 
specific human capital and other non-wage benefits, search costs as well as other individual 
characteristics. Many researchers have explored the relationship between wages and tenure. 
Topcl (1991) provides convincing evidence that wages rise with seniority. Others have taken 
wages as e.xogenous and focused on exit propensities and the influence of wages. Koch and 
Ragan (1986) argue that in unionized and public scctors. it is reasonable to assume wages 
cause quits, and not the reverse. Wage scales in the public sector are typically very structured 
and influenced by collective bargaining. Changes tend to be dominated by across the board 
increases in pay scales. Thus, at the micro level, it is plausible that workers take state wages 
as exogenous. This is the strategy that I adopt here. 
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Much of the research on quits has utilized the National Longitudinal Sur\'ey. 
However, the public sector is another area where turnover can be studied with micro data. 
States and the federal governments arc usually very large employers and micro level 
employment data is more readily available. Unfortunately, relative wages in the public sector 
are very stable and t>pically aren't as responsive to demand and supply shocks as are wages in 
the private sector. However, the implementation of comparable worth pay plans in Iowa state 
government provides an exogenous shock to relative wages that can be used to help identify 
the effects of public sector wages on quit propensity. 
This chapter develops an empirical model of quits for state employees in Iowa using 
payroll data for state employees from 1980-1992. The purpose is two fold. One is to 
examine the role of tenure and wages in turnover. The second is to develop statistical 
controls for selection bias for the union membership model developed previously. Section 5.2 
develops the empirical model. Section 5.3 provides a descriptive analysis of the payroll data. 
Section 5.4 reports the parameter estimates for three specifications. Section 5.5 explores the 
impact of comparable worth on parameter identification. Section 5.6 employs the empirical 
model to estimate the impact of comparable worth quits. 
5.2 Empirical Model of Quits 
Each worker chooses at time period t to remain employed in the public sector or to 
exit to the private sector. Employees compare the net benefit between the two employment 
opportunities based on a vector of exogenous factors. x„.i and a stochastic shock e,,. Let e,=I 
represent the choice of remaining in state government employment at time t and let Ct=0 
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represent exiting state government for employment elsewhere. An individual will choose to 
remain in the public sector labor market if 
E: = - U(e,=0^i,.t,£iJ > 0. (5.1) 
Unfortunately, the value of E* is not revealed to us. The sign of E* is revealed by 
observing if the individual is in the public sector labor market at time /. Assume that the net 
benefit from changing jobs can be represented as 
E,* = Xi ,.,a + £//. ( 
Assuming that eu is distributed normally, the decision to remain employed with the state 
government can then be represented as 
P { E *  > 0) = '"VcrWr = a>(.r,.,a) (5.3) 
where <f) is the normal density function and 0 is the normal distribution function. The 
marginal effect of an individual variable"' xj on the probability of an exit. P, is 
dp 
=  ( p { x a ) a  j .  ( 5 . 4 A )  
However, when .v, also has a quadratic term, the marginal effect is 
c P 
c X j 
= <p{xa)(aJ + la j-u\Xj ) (5.48) 
whcn.V;^/ = .v/. 
The elasticity is calculated as 
<f>ixa)a jX i 
e. = (5.5A) 
^ fD(.ra) 
The lime subscript is dropped here for notional ease 
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for nontransformcd variables. The elasticity for variables in log form is 
. (5.SB) 
' (X>ixa) 
5.3 Data 
Payroll data from the Iowa state government is used to develop the model estimates. 
The data arc observations of emplo>'mcnt in the last payroll period for each calendar year from 
1980 to 1992. The data is essentially the same as that used to model union membership in the 
previous section. However, when modeling quits, the data is not limited to employees 
covered by collective bargaining. Because this data has employee information that spans 13 
years, it is especially appealing for modeling quits. Over 13 years there will potentially be 
considerable variation in relative pay between the public and the private sectors. 
Table 5.1 lists descriptive statistics for the variables used to model the propensity to quit. One 
reason for modeling quits is to develop statistical controls for selection bias that may exist in 
the union membership model estimates developed in chapter 4. Management is not covered 
by collcctive bargaining and therefore does not really have the opportunity to join the union."' 
In developing the selection bias controls, it is desirable to have a model that is specific to the 
population. The estimates change little since management makes up such a small proportion 
of employees. Thus, I don\ exclude management employees when estimating the exit models 
used to develop selection bias controls for the union membership model. 
.AJI average of eight percent of workers exit from the state labor force each year. 
Most of the exits observed are permanent. Only about six percent of the workers observed 
A few eases exisi where managers will pay union dues. However, ihey are not covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement and their contributiotu* arc most likely motivated by things other than the union services provided. 
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Table 5.1 — Iowa State Government Employees, Variable Definitions, tVleans and 
Standard Deviations, 1981-1991 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Exit 1 if workers exiis the siaie labor force, zero 0.082 0.275 
otherwise 
dlnO\'agc) Log changc in the emptoyees biweekly wage 0.071 0.123 
dln(CPS Wage) Log change in the biweekly wage for the relevant 0.048 0.056 
job in the CPS data 
dln(Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) Log changc biweekly wage minus the log change 0.024 0.135 
in the biweekly wage for the relevant job in the 
CPS data 
In(Wagc),., Log of the biweekly wage at t-1 6.573 0.377 
Prior Experience Number of years between age 18 and employment 13.627 9.855 
with the state 
State Tenure Number of years of employment with the state 10.385 8.266 
State Tenure**2 The square of the number of years of employment 176.175 261.562 
with the state 
New Entrant 1 if the employee has less than one year of tenure 0.085 0.279 
Collective Bargaining 1 if the employee is covered by a collcctive 0.668 0.471 
bargaining agreement 
Part Time 1 if the employee is pan-time or seasonal 0.036 0.186 
Non-White 1 if the employee is a minority 0.039 0.194 
Female 1 if the employee is a female 0.482 0.500 
Married 1 if the employee is married 0.665 0.472 
Manager 1 if the employee is a manager 0.047 0.213 
Professional i if the employee has a professional occupation 0.245 0.430 
Technical 1 if the employee has a technical occupation 0.122 0.328 
Clerical ! if the employee has a clerical occupation 0.266 0.442 
Service/Blue Collar 1 if the employee has a service or blue collar 0.319 0.466 
occupation 
082 I if 1982 0.089 0.284 
D83 I if 1983 0.089 0.285 
D84 1 if 1984 0.090 0.287 
D85 1 if 1985 0.091 0.288 
D86 1 if 1986 0.087 0.282 
D87 1 if 1987 0.090 0.287 
D88 1 if 1988 0.091 0.288 
D89 1 if 1989 0.096 0.294 
D90 I if 1990 0.097 0.295 
D91 1 if 1991 0.091 0.288 
n=217.056 
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leaving the state government return before the end of the sample period. Almost 24% of the 
state labor force for the sample period is comprised of workers with three or less years of 
slate tenure. Around 11 % have more than 25 years with the state. Average tenure is slightly 
more than ten years. Figure 5.1 displays the distribution of tenure in the Iowa state 
government. The figure suggests that a substantial proportion of exits come from workers 
1 3 5 7 9 11 :3 TS 17 IS 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 
State Tenure 
Figure 5.1 — Proportion of Employees by Years of State Tenure, 1981-1991 
with very little tenure. Figure 5.2 reports the exit rates during the sample period by the years 
of state tenure when the exit occurs. The graph plots the actual quit or exit rate versus tenure. 
The data confirms the notion that relatively new workers have a higher tendency to quit. 
Calculated exit rates are high in the early years and then decline rapidly. Eventually the 
incidence of exits increases as workers approach retirement. The high rate of turnover in the 
early years of employment has been found in other empirical studies. This fact has been 
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Figure 5.2 — Exit Rates by Years of State Tenure, 1981-1991 
stylized into models of "matching." These models assert that asymmetric information exists 
between employee and employer. After a particular employment relationship is established, 
information is revealed to both employer and employee regarding the "match" between the 
skills needed in the occupations and the skills embodied in the individual. Good matches tend 
to survive. At any rate, it appears that a quadratic relationship may exist between state tenure 
and propensity to quit. 
Figure 5.3 graphs the exit rates for each year in the sample. The year is defined as the 
year the employee is last employed. The exit rates decline noticeably after 1985. 1985 is 
particularly of interest, because it is when the comparable worth play plans were first 
implemented. A second implementation occurred in 1987. Without considering any other 
factors, it appears that exit rates declined after the comparable worth pay plans were 
implemented. Thus the increases in wage differentials, or at least the notion of comparable 
worth, may have decreased incentives to leave the state labor market. 
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Figure 5.3 - Exit Rate by Year, 1981-1991 
As demonstrated previously, the implementation of comparable worth plans induccd 
changes in relative wages that arc rare in public sector labor markets'*. In the case at hand, 
intertemporal changes in an individual's wages and in the wage scales for each job 
classification are observed throughout the sample period. Two separate quasi-exogenous 
shocks to relative wages occurred as a result of the implementation of comparable worth pay 
plans. This phenomenon not only provides changcs in relative wages between aggregate 
occupations, but also generated changes in relative wages within each occupation. Figure 5.4 
shows the average changcs in starting pay for the five aggregate job types. The 
implementation of comparable worth in 1985 and 1987 clearly created inter-job variability in 
wage gains. Furthermore, these changes are not homogenous within aggregate job types. 
Figure 5.5 shows within each aggregate occupational classification the standard deviation of 
Kim (1989) found thai, in the Caiifomia state government, relative pay in the 1980"s was almost perfectly explained by 
relative pay in the 1930's. 
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Figure 5.5 - Individual Standard Deviations of Starting Pay, 1981-1991 
the percentage changes in starting pay. These shocks help identify the effects of wages on 
quits. 
5.4 Empirical Exit Model Estimates 
Three specifications were estimated, each differing in the assumed effect of 
contemporaneous wage gains on quits. The first specification allows internal and external 
wage gains to have asymmetric effects on the quit propensity. In this case, the currcnt wage 
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rcccivcd in the state government and the opportunity wage outside of state employment enter 
separately into the model. The second specification assumes that workers condition on the 
relative wage between the public and private sector. The third specification does not allow 
changcs in external wages, other than at a macro level, to affect quit propensities. 
Tabic 5.1 lists the variables used to model quits. ln(Wage),.i measures the individuals' 
relative position on the intra-firm wage distribution. Also included arc measures to control for 
wage levels, tenure, and non-specific experience. Also include are demographic variables to 
capture effects of gender, marital status, minority, broad occupational categories and part time 
employees. Similar variables have been included in many other studies. Thus, comparisons 
can be made to the previous research results. 
The models are estimated using annual dummy variables to capture time specific 
macro effects. Another alternative would be to include macro variables such as overall price 
indices, unemployment rates and other cyclical factors. I choose the dummy variable 
approach since many of the macro factors, such as grievance activities and 
management/employee relations could not be separately controlled for. Once one includes the 
dummy variables, time specific macro variables are redundant. In addition, transforming any 
of the independent variables by a time specific deflator will have absolutely no effect on any of 
the coefficients estimated, expect for the time specific constants. 
The model estimates are reported in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. Table 5.3 contains the 
annual dummy estimates and Tabic 5.2 contains continuous and categorical variable estimates. 
Included in the table are the parameter estimate and the estimated marginal effect per 
equations 5.4A and 5.4B. 
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Table 5.2 — Exit Model Full Sample Estimates 
Internal/External Relative Wage Internal Wage 
Wage Model Model Model 
Variable a a (^/fk a 
(iln(Wage) -0.3902 -0.0445 -0.3716 -0.0424 
(0.0386) (0.0383) 
dln(CPS Wage) 0.2008 0.0114 
(0.0758) 
dln(W'age) - din(CPS Wage) -0.3533 -0.0403 
(0.0348) 
ln(Wage),.| -0.2798 -0.0319 -0.2663 -0.0304 -0.2697 -0.0308 
(0.0243) (0.0236) (0.0242) 
Prior Expcriencc O.OI 15 0.0013 0.0115 0.0013 0.0114 0.0013 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
State Tenure" -0.0527 -0.0017 -0.0528 -0.0018 -0.0528 -0.0018 
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
State Tenure**2 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
New Entrant 0.2106 0.0240 0.2116 0.0241 0.2115 0.0241 
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Collective Bargaining -0.0872 -0.0100 -0.0840 -0.0096 -0.0881 -0.0101 
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Part Time 0.5586 0.0638 0.5625 0.0642 0.5613 0.0641 
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0176) 
Non-White 0.1792 0.0205 0.1791 0.0204 0.1783 0.0204 
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
Female 0.0627 0.0072 0.0637 0.0073 0.0640 0.0073 
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Married -0.1002 -0.0114 -0.1005 -O.OI 15 -0.1002 -0.0114 
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Manager -0.0614 -0.0070 -0.0642 -0.0073 -0.0627 -0.0072 
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) 
Technical -0.2043 -0.0233 -0.2012 -0.0230 -0.2020 -0.0231 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
Clerical -0.2334 -0.0266 -0.2274 -0.0259 -0.2302 -0.0263 
(0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0155) 
Scr\ice/Bluc Collar -0.1023 -0.0117 -0.0958 -0.0109 -0.1010 -0.0115 
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0147) 
Intercept 0.6937 0.0792 0.5936 0.0677 0.6363 0.0726 
(0.1613) (0.1551) (0.1606) 
Log Likelihood -58.023.4 -58.026.0 -58.053.9 
* Indicates nol significant at the .05 le\-t:l. Standai^ Errors arc lisled in parentheses. Marginal effects are computed using the overall average for 
each X Marginal cfTcct includes the impact of the quadratic term. 
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Table 5.3 — Exit Model Full Sample Estimates — Time Dummy Variables 
Internal/External Relative Wage Internal Wage 
Wage Model Model Model 
Variable a ^/ax a ^/ax a 
D82 -0.0136* -0.0015 -0.0128* -0.0015 -0.0154* -0.0018 
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0180) 
D83 -0.0066* -0.0008 -0.0137* -0.0016 0.0048* 0.0005 
(0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0181) 
D84 -0.0780 -0.0089 -0.0824 -0.0094 -0.0736 -0.0084 
(0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0185) 
085 0.0500 0.0057 0.0476 0.0054 0.0482 0.0055 
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) 
D86 -0.0927 -0.0106 -0.0932 -0.0106 -0.0966 -0.0110 
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0199) 
D87 -0.1084 -0.0124 -0.1119 -0.0128 -0.1133 -0.0129 
(0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0206) 
D88 -0.1533 -0.0175 -0.1585 -0.0181 -0.1557 -0.0178 
(0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0214) 
D89 -0.1633 -0.0186 -0.1717 -0.0196 -0.1627 -0.0186 
(0.0218) (0.0215) (0.0218) 
D90 0.0472 0.0054 0.0406 0.0046 0.0432 0.0049 
(0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
D9I -0.0245* -0.0028 -0.0274* -0.0031 -0.0296* -0.0034 
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) 
• Indicates not significant at the .05 Icvt?!. Standard Errors arc listed in parentheses. Marginal cflecis arc computed using the overall average 
for each x 
The estimates indicate an inelastic relationship between quits and wages. The 
estimates for dln(wage) suggest that a one-percent increase in state wages induces an 
instantaneous .0004 percentage point reduction in quits. This estimate is common across all 
three specifications used. The corresponding elasticity of quits with respect to public sector 
wages is approximately -0.8. The permanent cfTect of wages, as measured by InfwageJ,.,. is 
somewhat smaller but similar in magnitude to the instantaneous eflFect. When job-specific 
external wages, dln(CPS fVage),./, are allowed to enter the model explicitly, the effect of 
external wage changes is less pronounced than the effect of state wages. Theory would 
suggest that occupational choice would be conditioned on relative wages. However, based on 
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the likelihood ratio test, one must rejcct the hypothesis that these two coeflRcients have equal 
but opposite values. It is conceivable that quits arc less sensitive to external wages due to the 
non-wage cost of changing employers. Thus, there may be compensating diflFercntials that 
cause the public scctor employment to be relatively less responsive to external wages. The 
difference could also be due to error in the measurement of the true opportunity wage. 
Theory would also suggest that job-specific human capital would diminish the 
incentives to quit and that non-spccific human capital would tend to make workers tnore 
mobile and hence more likely to change jobs. The model estimated here is consistent with 
those presumptions. Prior Experience, the measure for non-specific human capital, tends to 
increase the incidence of quits, albeit with a very small elasticity. Each additional year of 
experience prior to state employment increases the probability of a quit by .0013. The 
estimated elasticity is approximately .31. Conversely state specific human capital, as 
measured by state tenure, decreases the quit rate. State tenure may have a slightly larger 
impact than prior experience. An additional year of state experience decreases the likelihood 
of a worker quitting by .0017, which corresponds to an elasticity of about -.32. In addition, 
workers with no state specific experience have an exit rate 2.4 percentage points higher than 
those with one year of tenure. The estimates for job tenure are consistent with Light and 
Urcta (1992). However, the impact of prior experience is negative in their hazard model. 
Their result seems counter-intuitive. The data they used has a richer set of information on 
tenure. They were able to exclude years of education from their prior experience variable, 
which 1 am not able to dc. However, they find that more education decreases the hazard 
rates, so that would not explain why they found prior experience to decrease quits. More 
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importantly, they were able to also control for time between jobs and the cumulative amount 
of time spent in the labor market. This very well could explain the differences between our 
results. Since my data did not include information on past labor market activity, it is not 
possible to determine if non-specific human capital or time spent outside the market, or both, 
arc driving my result of prior experience increasing quits. At any rate, it seems less plausible 
that non-specific experience would decrease quit propensity, unless it is simply identifying 
individuals that are more attached to the labor market and have therefore built up more years 
of labor market experience. 
As expected, collective bargaining reduces tumover. Collective bargaining tends to 
improve wages and working conditions'^. The collective voice provided by unions, in terms 
of contracts and grievance procedures, provides a vehicle to resolve issues so that workers do 
not have to vote with their feet. I find that workers covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement have a one-percent lower quit rate. This suggests that collective bargaining does 
rcduce quits, which is consistent wath Light and Urcta (1992). One could argue, however, 
that unions are more likely to try to win, and actually win, representation with groups of 
workers that have a lower quit rate. There are a few groups organized within the sample 
period, the largest being the clerical bargaining unit. 
The occupational dummies indicate that Clerical and Technical worker are the least 
likely to quit, followed by Service and Managers. Professional are most likely to exit, all else 
equal. This certainly seems reasonable since Professionals tend to be more mobile and are 
more likely to be competing in a national labor market. 
See Freeman and Mcdo(T(1981) for empirical eviiicnce. 
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The notion that unions arc simply organizing workers that are already less likely to 
quit can be addressed with the data at hand. Interacting "Collective Bargaining" with the 
occupational dummy variables allows us to explore the idea that collective bargaining has 
different impacts on quits depending on occupation. TTius, we add 4 additional dummy 
variables to Internal Wage model. The calculated likelihood ratio statistic is approximately 
12. This is marginally significant at the .025 level but not at the .01 level. Only the 
Ser^-ice/Bluc Collar interaction coeflricient is significant. Thus, there is evidence to suggest 
that the impact of collective bargaining does not depend on the occupation of the employee. 
This suggests that collective bargaining is reducing incentives to quit. 
The estimates for the individual characteristics are similar to the results of other 
studies. 1 find that non-white workers are 2% more likely to exit and part time workers are 
6% more likely to exit. In addition, marriage tends to decrease exit rates by 1%. These 
results arc consistent with findings by Mclaughlin (1991) and to some degree, with Light and 
Ureta (1992). Married individuals are more likely to have dependents on their income, and 
thus spells of unemployment are more difficult to ride out. However, when Light and Ureta 
(1992) estimate their model separately for males and females, they find that marriage 
decreases the hazard rate for males but increases it for females. As found in almost every 
empirical study. I find that females are more likely to exit. The estimates suggest that an 
average female worker has an exit rate that is one percentage point higher than an 
obscrvationally equivalent male. Light and Ureta (1992) and Shorcy (1983) find evidence that 
the structural relationships differ between male and females. However, Viscusi (1980) did 
not find gender differences in quit behavior. 
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Wages and tenure have strong impacts on the likelihood of quits for state employees in 
Iowa. As found in other studies, the incidence of quits is very high in the first few years of 
employment. Individual wages seem to be more imponant than opportunity wages. Clearly, 
turnover can be reduced by increasing relative wages. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure 
the costs of quits on both employers and employees. Thus, it is difficult to make any 
statements about the economic efficiency of the observed quits. 
5.5 Impact of Comparable Worth on Parameter Identification 
Comparable worth clearly impacts wages in Iowa state government. However, what 
impact this has upon our ability to estimate the model parameters is not so obvious. Mattila et 
al (1999) show that comparable worth was crucial in estimating an input demand system for 
state government. It would seem logical that it would also be crucial here as well. Mattila ei 
al modeled broad inputs at an aggregate division level, while I am looking at quits by 
modeling the individual workers. There will be more variability in relative wages at an 
indixadual level as opposed to the division and aggregate occupational level. 
The impacts of the comparable worth wage adjustments are explored by dividing the 
data into three time periods; pre-comparable worth, comparable worth, and post-comparable 
worth. Prc-comparable worth years are 1981-1984, comparable worth runs from 1985 
through 1987. and post-comparable worth years arc from 1988 through 1991. Estimates for 
the models are derived from each of the three periods. The internal wage model is re-
cstimatcd for the three sample periods, and the estimated parameters can be compared. The 
main interest is how comparable worth affccts our ability to estimate the impact of wages on 
incentives to quit 
Tabic 5.4 reports the estimates of model 1 for each period. Tabic 5.5 reports the 
parameter estimates, a. for cach period relative to the full sample estimates that were reported 
in Table 5.2. 
Although the comparable worth period covcrs the fewest years, the estimates for 
Table 5.4 Internal Wage Model - Time Specific Parameter Estimates 
Pre Comp. Worth Comp Worth Post Comp Worth 
81-84 85-87 88-91 
a a a (^CX 
dln(Wage) -0.3170 -0.0362 -0.3518 -0.0402 -0.4233 -0.0483 
(0.0565) (Omil)  (0.0764) 
InCWage),.) -0.1959 -0.0224 -0.2327 -0.0266 -0.4070 -0.0465 
(0.0388) (0.0494) (0.0432) 
Prior Experience 0.0090 0.0010 0.0153 0.0017 0.0120 0.0014 
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
State Tenure"* -0.0640 -0.0026 -0.0465 -0.0011 -0.0448 -0.0013 
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0028) 
State Tcnure**2 0.0020 0.0018 0.0016 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
New Entrant 0.1767 0.0202 0.1352 0.0154 0.2978 0.0340 
(0.0215) (0.0293) (0.0260) 
Collective Bargaining -0.0415 -0.0047 -0.0740 -0.0085 -0.1862 -0.0213 
(0.0167) (0.0226) (0.0197) 
Part Time 0.5536 0.0632 0.5721 0.0653 0.5286 0.0603 
(0.0289) (0.0349) (0.0298) 
Non-White 0.1665 0.0190 0.1324 0.0151 0.2037 0.0233 
(0.0331) (0.0399) (0.0278) 
Female 0.0576 0.0066 0.0844 0.0096 0.0699 0.0080 
(0.0160) (0.0186) (0.0160) 
Married -0.0944 -0.0108 -0.0985 -0.0112 -0.1005 -0.0115 
(0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0148) 
Manager -0.1357 -0.0155 -0.0151* -0.0017 -0.0357" -0.0041 
(0.0372) (0.0420) (0.0384) 
Technical -0.2399 -0.0274 -0.1818 -0.0207 -0.1738 -0.0198 
(0.0277) (0.0318) (0.0284) 
Clerical -0.2334 -0.0266 -0.2178 -0.0249 -0.2215 -0.0253 
(0.0250) (0.0301) (0.0265) 
Service/Blue Collar -0.1185 -0.0135 -0.0864 -0.0099 -0.0920 -0.0105 
(0.0252) (0.0278) (0.0243) 
Intercept 0.2653* 0.3076* 1.3924 
(0.2563) (0.3387) (0.3035) 
Log Likelihood -23.273.2 -15.361.3 -19.312.0 
n 77.415 58.249 81.392 
* Indicates not significant at Ihc OS level Standard Errors are listed in parentheses. Marginal cflTects are computed using the 
overall average for cach x. *• .Vlarginal efl«;t includes the impact of Ihc quadratic term. 
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(iln(Wage) and ln(Wage),.i derived from the comparable worth period are closest to the full 
sample estimates. However, the magnitude of the estimates is very similar. The comparable 
worth period contains approximately 30% fewer observations than the pre or post periods do. 
All in all. the results are very consistent between each of the periods. Qualitatively, 
the results are identical for the three periods. With the exception of the manager dummy and 
the annual dummies, all variables are significant at the .025 level. NMiile this is not surprising 
given the number of observations, it is surprising to get such consistency across the sample 
periods given the variability seen in the exit rates over the years studied. The stability of the 
parameters suggests that reasonable estimates can be estimated with data that covers a 
narrower window of time. Clearly, comparable worth impacts the parameter estimates. 
However, the impact won't be as dramatic when micro data is used. In general, the ability to 
estimate the impact, of wages on quits can be enhanced by using study behavior over longer 
periods and for periods where significant relative wage changes occur. 
Table 5.5 - Internal Wage Gain Model Relative Parameter Estimates 
Pre Comp. Worth Comp Worth Post Comp Worth 
81-84 85-87 88-91 
dln(\Vage) 0.85 0.95 1.14 
Ln(Wage),-, 0.73 0.86 1.51 
Prior Experience 0.79 1.34 1.04 
State Tenure 1.21 0.88 0.85 
State Tenure**2 1.11 0.98 0.89 
New Entrant 0.84 0.64 1.41 
Collective Bargaining 0.47 0.84 2.11 
Part Time 0.99 1.02 0.94 
Non-White 0.93 0.74 1.14 
Female 0.90 1.32 1.09 
Married 0.94 0.98 1.00 
Manager 2.17 0.24 0.57 
Technical 1.19 0.90 0.86 
Clerical l.Ol 0.95 0.96 
Service/Blue Collar 1.17 0.86 0.91 
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5.6 Comparable Worth Impact on Quits 
The estimates presented previously indicate that wage gains reduce quits. Since 
comparable worth caused permanent shifts in relative wages, it is reasonable to ask what 
impact the comparable worth wage increases had on quits. Unlike across the board wage 
adjustments, changes in relative wages can have permanent effects on the makeup of the labor 
force. 
The comparable worth wage adjustments occurred in two specific years. 1985 and 
1987. This makes it easier to explore a counterfactual state where no comparable worth wage 
increases occurred. The strategy used is to back out the wage increases and use the inodel to 
predict quits in the absence of the comparable worth wage adjustments. These predictions are 
compared to the model predictions with the comparable worth wage increases lefl intact. 
The comparable worth wage increases are identified by looking at the change in 
minimum salary in 1985 and 1987. Since all changes in the pay plans in 1985 were the result 
of comparable worth, the adjustment in 1985 can be measured as the log change in the 
minimum salary for each detailed job. The impact in 1987 is muddled by the fact that wage 
increases included non-comparable worth changes to the pay scales. Fortunately, previous 
work has identified the number of pay steps each occupation received as a result of 
comparable worth. Analysis of the pay plans indicates that there is approximately a 4% 
difference between each pay scale. Let dln(Min Wagc)i9g5./ be the log change in the minimum 
biweekly salary for job i in 1985. Let CWADJ, be the increase in the pay grade for job / as a 
result of comparable worth. The wage impact of comparable for job i in 1987. dCW,Q87., is 
then calculated as 
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dCW;»s- = MAX(0.04*(CWADJi)-dIn(Mm fVage)/M>.,. 0). 
The results are measures for the impact of comparable worth in 1987 for cach job within the 
state govemment. 
The mechanics of creating the data for the counterfactual state are straightforward. 
The calculated 1985 comparable worth wage change for a given job is subtracted from 
dIn(Wage)iqs5 and from ln(Wage),.i for each year between 1986 and 1991. The calculated 
1987 comparable worth wage change for a given job is subtracted from dln(Wage)iqs7 and 
from ln(Wagc),.i for each year between 1988 and 1991. The remaining data is left intact. 
Aggregate estimates for the impact of the comparable worth wage gains in the post 
comparable worth period are reported in Table 5.6. Estimates are shown for the five 
aggregate job classes, for male and female employees, and overall. The results suggest that 
comparable worth reduced quits by 3.9% or about 59 employees per year or 410 over the 
seven-year period.*" However, the comparable worth wage adjustments did not affect each 
occupational category equally. As seen in Figure 5.4 previously, the average wage increase is 
the largest in the Service-^lue Collar occupations. It follows that the impact on quits would 
thus be the largest for this occupation. Comparable worth reduced the number of quits by an 
estimated 186 employees, about 5.7%, during 1885-1991. The predicted quit rate is 
estimated to he .44 percentage points lower. As you can see from the table, this estimate is 
much larger than for the other four occupations. A somewhat distant second were Clerical 
workers. The estimates suggest that the number of clcrical quits was reduced by 3.5% over 
The simulations were also run uithout including the annual dummies in the model. This tended to magnify the 
estimated impact of comparable worth by about 105 quits overall. This could be the result of the dummies capturing 
the across the board \^-agc increase or the dummies measuring some latent efTect of comparable worth. 
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Table 5.6 — Impact of Comparable on Quits Based on the Counterfactual State of No 
Comparable Worth Wage Gains, 198S-1991 
Average Exit Rate Predicted Predicted Change in Change in Percentage 
Number of .\ctuai Counter- the Exit number of change in 
Employees Exit Rate Factual Exit Rate Employees Exits 
Per Vear Rate per Year 
Manager 935 6.26% 5.76''/o 5.90% -0.140% -1 -2.43% 
Prof. 5067 l.W'o 8.09% 8.33% -0.237% -12 -2.93% 
Tech. 2422 6.12% 5.95° 0 6.12% -0.175% -4 -2.94% 
Clerical 5248 8.00% 7.83% 8.10% -0.273% -14 -3.49% 
Scrv/BC 6276 7.44% 7.48% 7.91% -0.425% -27 -5.67'"o 
Male 10248 6.69% 6.70% 6.91% -0.202% -21 -3.01°o 
Female 9701 8.28% 8.26% 8.65% -0.390% -38 -4.73% 
Overall 19949 7.47% 7.46% 7.75% -0.294% -59 -3.93% 
1985-1991. This corresponds to around 187 workers (27 per year) over the seven years 
following comparable worth. The impacts on Professional and Technical workers are almost 
identical, although they have dissimilar quit rates. The number of quits was reduced by 2.9% 
in both eases. Since there are more than twice as many Professionals as Technical employees, 
the decrease in the number of Professionals is much higher than the number of Technicians. 
The impact on management, as you might expect, is very small. 
Comparable worth adjustments tended to be larger in jobs traditionally dominated by 
females. Thus, it is logical to ask to what degree this slowed female quits. The results in 
Table 5.6 suppon the notion that females enjoyed larger comparable worth wage increases, 
and thus incentives for them to quit were reduced. The state labor force is almost evenly split 
with roughly 48% female."' The estimates are that females quits were reduced by 4.7% (265 
quits), while quits involving male employees were reduced by 3% (145 quits.) Given the 
Sec Table 5.1 
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asymmctric impact of comparable worth, one might expect that females could gain in terms of 
their employment share. Figure 5.6 shows the actual proportion of female workers for each 
year. After 1987. the proportion of female employees climbed noticeably. From 1985 to 
1991. the number of female employees posted a net increase of 397. Some of this was due to 
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Figure 5.6 — Proportion of Female Workers 1981 to 1991 
changcs in overall employment levels. A corresponding decrease of 191 male employees 
occurrcd over the same period. The magnitude of the changcs is not inconsistent with the 
simulation results. Furthermore, increases in relative wages most likely affected the relative 
number of female applicants. Orazem and Mattila (1998) found that comparable worth wage 
adjustments would induce more women applicants, especially in traditionally female 
dominated jobs. All this suggests that comparable worth had a somewhat larger impact on 
female employees, permanently increasing females' share of employment in the state labor 
force. 
The next step is to look at the impact of the comparable worth adjustments for each 
year after comparable worth. Figure 5.7 graphs the predicted change in the number of quits 
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Figure 5.7 - Predicted Decrease in Quits As a Result of Comparable Worth 
due to comparable worth. Figure 5.8 displays the corresponding predicted percentage change 
in quits cach year. The largest impact in terms of number of employees appears to be in 1985 
and in 1987. when the wage changes occurred. There was also a spike in 1990. This was 
most likely precipitated by the wage freeze that was imposed in that year. TTie accelerated exit 
rales in 1990. presumably because of the wage stagnation, magnified the estimated effect of 
comparable worth. The largest percentage changes in quits occurred in 1987. However, it 
docs seem that comparable worth did have a persistent impact on quit rates. The impact 
seems to be very slowly declining after 1987. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Wage changes, especially relative wage changes, have a significant impact on quits. In 
addition to a contemporaneous effect, there appears to be a persistent impact that results from 
relative and absolute wage changes. Comparable worth did indeed induce a relative wage 
change. Tnis seems to have reduced the number of quits by about 4%. This may have 
resulted in an increase in the proportion of females in the state labor force. The results of the 
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Figure 5.8 — Predicted Percentage Reduction in Quits Due to Comparable Worth 
models estimated suggest that quits have an inelastic response to wages. Quits also are 
affected by. to a lesser degree, prevaQing wages in the private sector. Unfortunately. I have 
no dircct measure for the costs of separations to both employer and employees. Having this 
information would allow one to address the social costs and benefits of labor market turnover. 
Other parameter values, for the most part, are consistent with previous work. Firm 
specific experience tends to decrease quits, while non-specific experience tends to increase 
this propensity. Collective bargaining has the expected effect of reducing quits. Female, 
single, non-white and part time workers are more likely to quit. 
The next step is to use the model developed here to control for selection bias that may 
exist when we attempt to model union membership. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 - UNION MEMBERSHIP MODEL WITH NON-RANDOM 
SELECTION 
6.1 Introduction 
Observing voluntary payments of union dues provides a mechanism for the revelation 
of workers' preference for services unions provide. The model developed in chapter 4 
assumed independence between the choice of union membership and occupation. 
Unfortunately, we only have the opportunity to observe an individual's contribution toward 
collective bargaining if he has already choscn to participate in the public sector labor market. 
This fact is not necessarily a problem as long as the stochastic disturbances for union 
membership and public sector employment arc not correlated. However, the estimated 
parameters for the membership decision will be biased if correlation between the errors exists. 
Thus, the model developed in Chapter 5 is used to control for the potential correlation and 
provide unbiased estimates of the parameters of the dues models. 
The estimated parameters for equation 5.3 will be used to develop the statistical 
controls for selection bias. The internal wage gain specification reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
will be used to derive a term, as described in Heckman (1979). The ideal control for 
selection bias would model occupation choice for the entire labor market. However, the data 
necessary to develop such a model is difficult to obtain. I thus rely on the rich information of 
the payroll data and the model developed in Chapter 5 to provide the selection bias controls. 
This means the model only incorporates workers who were employed with the state at some 
point. Those workers who have never chosen state employment cannot be explicitly modeled. 
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6.2 Empirical Model with Selectivity Control 
The model developed in Chapter 4 is extended to incorporate the non-random 
selection that may exist in the payroll data for the Iowa state government. .A.gain. we assume 
that net utility from membership is 
.As before, we do not obsen e the net benefit from membership, M". but may observe its sign. 
Thus, as developed in Chapter 4, the probability that M* > 0 is given by 
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the sign of M' for those individuals that exit the 
public scctor labor market. An individual would choose to remain employed with the state if 
their net benefit is higher by remaining in their state job versus exiting and being employed 
in the private sector. Let represent the choice of remaining in state government 
employment, and let e=0 represent exiting state government for employment elsewhere. An 
individual will choose to remain in the public sector labor market if 
The stochastic error processes ,//, and s,., are distributed 
bnfO.O.l.a.p). 
The sign of A/* is only observed if E' is greater than zero. Unless p is equal to zero, 
estimating 6.2 directly with the Iowa payroll data would yield biased parameter estimates. 
The estimation procedure must control for this potential bias. The model developed in 
Chapter 5 can be used to derive controls for the self-selection out of slate employment. The 
decision to remain employed with the state government is represented as 
Sr = V(m^I.X^,,U.J - V(m=G.X._,,/jJ. (6.1) 
(6.2) 
E '  =  U ( c = I . X „ . , . -  U ( e = O . X „ _ , £ ^ , J  >  0 .  (6.3) 
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PtE* > 0) = [ '" " ^.z)dz = ~ s,_i). (6.4) 
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The estimated parameters for equation 6.4 are used to calculate a selection correction 
factor, /L /. is calculated as 
. (6.S, 
Incorporating the selection bias term into equation 6.2 we have 
P( A/* > Oj£* > 0) = f ^ ' ^z)dz = <X>{Xi^+d/.i + Ui) (6.6) 
J—CC 
Estimating equation 6.6 provides unbiased estimates of fi. We can then calculate the 
elasticities specified in equations 4.4.A. and 4.4B by setting A equal to zero. These elasticities 
are thus for the uncensored population. 
6.3 Data 
The payroll data for the Iowa state employees is again used to estimate the 
membership model. The 13 year panel of data provides the variability needed to identify 
parameters of both the membership and the exit models. The data used in Chapter 5 utilized 
information for both union and non-unionized employees. In other words, the model for 
exits is estimated using a broader population than just the organized workers in the Iowa 
state go\ emment. This allows us to develop the selection correction factor for those workers 
who may not have been in a job covered by a collective bargaining agreement in i-l. 
6.4 .Model Estimates 
The general form of equation 6.6 was estimated for the absolute wage, the 
public/private wage and the relative wage models developed in Chapter 4. .A.n additional 
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dummy vanablc was added for employees who arc new entrants into the state labor pool. 
Since A is a function of .r,./. it cannot be calculated for those workers who were not in the 
state labor pool in t-1. A is defined to be zero for these cases, and the effect is capturcd 
through a dummy variable. 
Table 6.1 contains the parameter estimates of the three specifications of equation 6.1. 
The parameter estimates for the most part do not change drastically when the selection bias is 
accounted for. The estimates for the impact of wage services are very similar. The impacts of 
employment changes are now all positive in all the specifications, but not significantly different 
from zero. It does appear that most of the parameter estimates, with the exception of the 
dues parameter, get smaller in magnitude once selection is accountcd for. 
The estimates for Pay Step have changed, however. The estimates for the absolute 
wage gain model and the public/private model changed from positive and significant to 
negative and significant when selection bias is controlled for. The Relative Wage model 
estimate for Pay Step decreased in magnitude but is still positive. It appears that the estimated 
positive impact of pay step on union membership was an artifact of self-selection. Those 
workers who have lower tenure will be more heavily represented at the lower steps of the pay 
plan. These workers are also more likely to exit. Once selectivity is controlled for. the impact 
of relative position appears to be negative. This implies that as workers gain job specific 
tenure, the willingness to pay for union membership decreases. This seems to be counter 
intuitive. Unions typically bargain for seniority rights of their constituents. When employees 
have to be reallocated, preferences are usually given to more senior workers. However, the 
collective bargaining agreement typically spells out these arrangements and the rules apply to 
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Table 6.1 - Union Demand Estimates with Selectivity Controls 
Variable Absolute Wage Public/Private Relative Wage 
Gain Model Wage Gain Model Gain Model 
fl cp/fX P rp/tx cp/cx 
dlnOMinimum Wage) 1.3577 0.3788 
(0.1205) 
dln(\Vage) 1.7321 0.4833 
(0.0471) 
dln(CPS Wage) 0.1650* 0.0460 
(0.0878) 
dln(Wage) - dln(Min Wage) 1.6515 0.4669 
(0.0468) 
dln(Min Wage) - dln(CPS Wage) 0.9565 0.2704 
(0.0652) 
dln(Rclative Wage) 0.5838 0.1041 
(0.0376) 
ln(Relative Wage) 0.6701 0.1195 
(0.0191) 
InCWage),., 1.8250 0.5092 1.7982 0.5084 
(0.0319) (0.0318) 
ln(CPS Wage),., -0.4280 -0.1194 -0.4559 -0.1289 
(0.0198) (0.0198) 
Pay Step -0.3909 -0.1091 -0.3981 -0.1125 0.3856 0.0688 
(0.0653) (0.0652) (0.0622) 
Dues -0.0048 -0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0006 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Total Dues/ 1000 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
7 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 
dln( FTE) 0.4068' 0.1135 0.0760* 0.0215 0.0149* 0.0027 
(0.3065) (0.3055) (0.3037) 
Overtime Indicator 0.0763 0.0213 0.0728 0.0206 0.0632 0.0113 
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0085) 
Prior Experience -0.0006* -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0005* -0.0001 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
State Tenure -0.0113 -0.0031 -0.0113 -0.0032 -0.0092 -0.0016 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
/. 0.2392 0.2314 0.4596 
(0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0259) 
/. Dummy -0.6209 
-0.6242 -0,6307 
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0162) 
Log Likelihood -84401.9 -84665.8 -85661.0 
* Indicates not sigoificani at the 05 level. Standard cn-ors are listed in parentheses. Marginai eflccts are computed using the overall average 
for each x 
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Table 6.1 (Cont.) 
Variable Absolute Wage Public and Private Relative Wage 
Gain Model Wage Gain Model Gain Model 
P t'p/l'x P dp/fx P cp/cx 
Part Time -0.3678 -0.1026 -0.3772 -0.1066 -0.3807 -0.0679 
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0282) 
Non-White 0.1503 0.0419 0.1461 0.0413 0.1689 0.0301 
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0179) 
Female 0.1720 0.0480 0.1758 0.0497 0.0577 0.0103 
(0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0085) 
Married -0.0529 -0.0148 -0.0513 -0.0145 -0.0545 -0.0097 
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0078) 
Technical 0.4756 0.1327 0.4620 0.1306 0.2396 0.0427 
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0180) 
Clerical 0.1312 0.0366 0.1021 0.0289 -0.3175 -0.0566 
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0141) 
Servicc/Bluc Collar 1.2063 0.3366 1.1892 0.3362 0.7907 0.1410 
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0148) 
intercept -9.3890 -8.7809 -0.8595 
(0.1944) (0.1921) (0.0709) 
082 -0.0321* -0.0089 -0.0941 -0.0266 -0.6409 -0.1143 
(0.0257) (0.0255) (0.0223) 
D83 0.1126 0.0314 -0.0680 -0.0192 -0.5890 -0.1050 
(0.0271) (0.0259) (0.0219) 
D84 -0.0215' -0.0060 -0.1187 -0.0336 -0.5786 -0.1032 
(0.G26S) (0.0264) (0.0241) 
D85 -0.0803 -0.0224 -0.1365 -0.0386 -0.5416 -0.0966 
(0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0205) 
D86 0.0429' 0.0120 -0.1547 -0.0437 -0.4842 -0.0864 
(0.02i3) (0.0195) (0.0174) 
D87 -0.0526' -0.0147 -0.0926 -0.0262 -0.4001 -0.0714 
(0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0268) 
D88 0.0305' 0.0085 -0.0541 -0.0153 -0.2953 -0.0527 
(0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0207) 
D89 -0.0548* -0.0153 -0.1258 -0.0356 -0.3137 -0.0559 
(0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0300) 
D90 -0.0816 -0.0228 -0.1566 -0.0443 -0.2717 -0.0485 
(0.0203) (0.0200) (0.0196) 
D91 0.1482 0.0413 -0.0530 -0.0150 -0.0788 -0.0141 
(0.0197) (0.0176) (0.0170) 
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all covcrcd workers. Hencc, the rules are very much a public good. These rules do little in 
the way of protecting newer employees. It could be argued that as a worker gains tenure, the 
value of the seniority rules increases, sincc they are less likely to be adversely affectcd when 
cmplo>Tnent changes. Less tenured workers are more likely to be adversely impacted and 
presumably then perceive a higher likelihood of filing a grievance via the collective bargaining 
grievance procedures. While unions may be obliged to represent all workers in formal 
grievance procedures, they most likely would not pursue a case invoKing a non-member as 
aggressively as they might dues paying members. 
Table 6.2 contains the calculated elasticities for the models with and without the 
sclcction correction. For the most part, the magnitudes increase when selection bias is 
accounted for. Remember that it appeared that the parameter estimates were getting smaller 
when the selection correction was included. However, the predicted probability of paying 
dues when evaluated at sample means also became smaller (from .33 to .20), and so the 
resulting elasticities became larger when evaluated at sample means. Consequently, the 
elasticities are being evaluated at diiferent points on the normal density and distribution 
functions even though the same values for .r arc used in both cases. Since the uncensored 
population has a lower membership rate, and both the ccnsored and uncensored populations 
arc in the lower half of the distribution, <t>(xp) decreases proportionally more than (p(xfi). 
Consequently the ratio, (pCxfi) (pfxfi} increases. This increase dominates the effect of the 
smaller y9s estimated with the correction for sample selection. 
The effect of relative wages and wage gains has essentially the same interpretation 
with and without the selection bias term. However, controlling for selection bias, the 
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Tabie 6.2 - Union Demand Elasticities and Dues Crowding Parameter 
Absolute Wage Public/Private Relative Wage 
Gain Model Wage Gain Model Gain Model 
Without 
3i 
With 
X 
Without 
I. 
With Without 
\ 
With 
3L 
dln(Minimuin Salar>') 1.52 1.90 
dln(Wage) 1.98 2.43 
dln(CPS Wage) 0.08 0.23 
dln(.\ct Sal) - dln(Min Sal) 1.89 2.30 
dln(Mln Sal) - dln(CPS Wage) 1.16 1.33 
dln(Rclativc Wage) 0.68 1.02 
ln(Relativc Wage) 0.84 1.17 
ln(Actijal Salar>-),., 2.10 2.56 2.07 2.50 
in(CPS Wage),., 
-0.53 -0.60 -0.56 -0.63 
Pay Step 0.41 -0.63 0.40 -0.64 1.70 0.77 
Dues 
-0.84 -1.14 -0.80 -1.08 -0.56 -1.01 
Total Dues /lOOO 
-0.17 -0.21 -0.18 -0.21 -0.24 -0.35 
7 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 
dln( FTE) 0.20 0.57 -0.18 0 . 1 1  -0.22 0.03 
elasticity for Pay Step becomcs negative, since the parameter estimate is negative, in the 
model with absolute wage and public/private wage gains. This is again likely due to the 
correlation between tenure and propensity to exit. 
One of the more interesting results is the elasticity for the dues rate. In the absolute 
wage gain model and the public/private wage gain, the magnitudes are now slightly greater 
than one and the relative wage gain model essentially equal to one. These estimates arc 
consistent with an equilibrium where union revenues are maximized. Unitary elasticity has 
some implications as to the "public" nature of union services. Public goods are necessarily 
non-rival in consumption, in this case, allowing more members to join, at least at the margin, 
would not increase the costs of providing services, given the definition of the bargaining units. 
However, membership rates could have some impact on the efficiency of the union in 
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providing union services. Unions with more members may have more leverage with 
management during contract negotiations. However, this may call into question the 
cxoseniety of the wage gains received by workers. At the individual level, wages are assumed 
exogenous to the employee. 
A pure public good implies that individuals do not care who purchases additional units 
of the good. Once the good is produced, it is available for all to share in non-rival 
consumption. WTiilc the estimated impact of other's dues contributions docs decrease the 
likelihood of paying dues, own contributions have a much larger impact. This suggests that 
others' contributions are not pcrfect substitutes for their own contributions. 
The crowding parameter, y, is again simply the ratio of the effect of others' 
contributions relative to the impact of own contributions. The estimates are almost identical 
across the three specifications. The estimates are very small, consistent with findings in 
Chapter 4. While the other contributions do have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on membership, this effect is much smaller than their own contributions. This suggests 
that union membership is much closer to a private good than to a pure public good. 
6.5 Impact of Comparable Worth on Parameter Identification 
Comparable worth provided permanent shocks to relative wages in the Iowa state 
government. Chapter 5 demonstrated that comparable worth was important to estimate the 
impact of wages on quits. It should be expected that comparable worth wage adjustments 
would also enhance our ability to estimate the impact of wages on union membership. 
The impacts of the comparable worth wage adjustments are explored, as was done in 
Chapter 5, by dividing the data into three periods: pre-comparable worth, comparable worth. 
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and post-comparable worth. Pre-comparabie worth years are 1982-1984. comparable worth 
runs from 1985 to 1987, and post-comparable worth years arc from 1988 to 1992. The 
Public/Private Wage Gain model is estimated for each of the periods. The results are reported 
in Table 6.3. 
The difference in the estimates across the sub-periods is greatest for the wage 
variables. The pre-comparabie worth estimates have smaller estimated impacts of public and 
private wage gains and of wage levels, and the estimated impacts of external wages and public 
wage gains arc not significant. This supports the notion that relative wage changes caused by 
comparable worth are necessary to estimate the effects of wages. The pre-comparabie worth 
period and the comparable worth period estimates are derived from the same number of 
years. Sample sizes differ as the clerical bargaining unit was not organized until 1985 and the 
professional bargaining unit was not organized for 1983. The wage estimates for the 
comparable worth period are similar to the post comparable worth period, which has 5 years 
of data, and the overall estimates reported earlier. The wage estimates derived from the 
comparable worth and the post-comparable worth periods are very similar. The impact is 
most dramatic on the wage variables. If one had only the pre-comparabie worth sample, the 
inferences about the role of wages would be much diflFerent. 
6.6 Comparable Worth Impact on Union Membership 
The estimates presented previously have shown union membership to be very wage 
elastic. Thus, it is reasonable to expcct that the comparable worth wage gains had a dramatic 
effect on union membership. This hypothesis is supported by the data: union membership did 
increase after the comparable worth pay plans were implemented. This section uses a similar 
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Table 6.3 - Union Demand -Public/Private Wage Gain - Time Specific Parameter 
Estimates 
Pre Comp. Worth Comp. Wortli Post Comp. Worth 
82-84 85-87 88-92 
Variable e rp/rx 0 rp/rx P rp/rx 
dlnCWagc) - dln(Min Wage) 0.2401 0.0679 1.2996 0.3674 2.0083 0.5677 
(0.1088) (0.1015) (0.0711) 
dln(Min Wage) - dln(CPS 0.Q870' 0.0246 2.0269 0.5730 0.9741 0.2754 
Wage) 
(0.1409) (0.1307) (0.0991) 
InfWagc),-, 0.2914 0.0824 1.6869 0.4769 2.1115 0.5969 
(0.0850) (0.0620) (0.0457) 
ln(CPS Wage),., 0.0166' 0.0047 -0.2773 -0.0784 -0.6858 -0.1939 
(0.0488) (0.0387) (0.0274) 
Pay Step 0.6569 0.1857 -0.0590" -0.0167 -0.9710 -0.2745 
(0.1409) (0.1307) (0.0991) 
Dues -0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0042 -0.0012 -0.0045 -0.0013 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0,0002) 
Total Dues/ 1000 -0.0065 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0002 
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Y 0.0021 0.0004 0.0002 
dln( FTE) -1.5922 -0.4501 0.4211' 0.1190 1.4301 0.4043 
(0.7544) (0.5112) (0.5127) 
Overtime Indicator 0.1467 0.0415 0.0495 0.0140 0.0742 0.0210 
(0.0192) (0.0165) (0.0120) 
Prior Experience 0.0003' 0.0001 -0.0002' -0.0001 -0.0009* -0.0003 
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
St£ts Tenure -0.0026' -0.0007 -0.0133 -0.0038 -0.0120 -0.0034 
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
0.4426 0.1988 0.2477 
(0.0619) (0.0505) (0.0372) 
t. Dummy -0.7040 
-0.6636 -0.5895 
(0.0318) (0.0306) (0.0254) 
Part Time -0.4623 -0.1307 -0.4618 -0.1306 -0.3134 -0.0886 
(0.0781) (0.0562) (0.0374) 
Non-White 0.2035 0.0575 0.1668 0.0472 0.1328 0.0375 
(0.0447) (0.0378) (0.0232) 
Female 0.1073 0.0303 0.2100 0.0594 0.1706 0.0482 
(0.0201) (0.0176) (0.0125) 
Married -0.0534 -0.0151 -0.0560 -0.0158 -0.0593 -0.0168 
(0.0177) (0.0149) (0.0110) 
Technical 0.6041 0.1708 0.5594 0.1582 0.5042 0.1426 
(0.0396) (0.0380) (0.0278) 
Clerical 0.1962 0.0555 0.1912 0.0541 0.1365 0.0386 
(0.0391) (0.0365) (0.0238) 
Service/Blue Collar 1.2037 0.3403 1.2552 0.3549 1.2435 0.3515 
(0.0375) (0.0372) (0.0247) 
n=31.822 n=42.I44 n=74.043 
' Indicates not significant at the .05 level Sundard enxjrs air listed in parentheses. Marginal eflwts are computed using the overall 
avcraf^c for cach x and the full parameler estimates to evaluate the normal density function. 
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methodology as that used in Chapter 5 to estimate the impact of the comparable worth wage 
gains on union membership. 
As in Chapter 5, the comparable worth wage increases are identified by looking at the 
changes in minimum salary in 1985 and 1987. Since all changes in the pay plans in 1985 were 
the result of comparable worth; the adjustment in 1985 can be measured as the log change in 
the minimum salary for each detailed job. The impact in 1987 is obscured by the fact that 
wage increases included non-comparable worth changes to the pay scales. Analysis of the pay 
plans indicates that there is approximately a 4% difference between each pay scale. Let 
dln(Min Wage)!vsy, be the log change in the minimum biweekly salary for job i in 1985. Let 
CWADJ, be the increase in the pay grade for job i as a result of comparable worth. The wage 
impact of comparable worth for job i in 1987. dCWi<)s7.i is calculated as 
= MAX(0.04*(CWADJO -dlnfMin fVage) ,9ss... 0). 
The resuhs arc measures for the impact of comparable worth in 1987 for each job within the 
state government. 
The mechanics of creating the data for the counterfactual state are straightforward. 
The calculated 1985 comparable worth wage change for a given job is subtracted from 
dlnfWageJiQsu dln(Min Wage)t9ss, and from ln(Wage),.i for each year between 1986 and 
1992. The calculated 1987 comparable worth wage change for a given job is subtracted from 
dlnfWage)I9S7, dln(Min fVageJiw. and from ln(Wage),.i for each year between 1988 and 
1992. The remaining data is left intact. The estimates from the Public/Private wage gain 
model used are used to evaluate the change in membership resulting from comparable worth 
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wage gains. Comparable worth wage adjustments are job specific, so they do not impact the 
measured private wage gains. 
Aggregate estimates for the impact of the comparable worth wage gains in the post 
comparable worth period arc reported in Table 6.4. Estimates are shown for the five 
Table 6.4 - Impact of Comparable Worth on Union Membership Based on the 
Counterfactual State of No Comparable Worth Wage Gains, 1985-1992 
Actual Predicted Change Due to Comparable Worth 
Nuaiber of 
Enployecs Per 
Vc«r 
Menbenhip 
Rate 
Actual 
Menbenhip 
Rate 
Conaicrfacnial 
Meaibcnhip 
Rate 
Meaibcrsiiip Nonber of 
Rate Members per 
Vear 
PerceataKe 
chaage ia 
Meaiberfbip 
Prof. 2448 30.51% 3i.02% 28.37% 2.645% 65 8.53''/o 
Tech 2054 28.67% 28.63% 25.68% 2.946°/^ 60 10.29% 
Clerical 4384 21.23% 21.34% 18.31% 3.032% 133 14.20% 
Serv/BC 5637 53.78% 53.71% 46.79% 6.920% 390 12.88% 
Male 7150 40.30% 40.70% 37.19% 3.511% 251 8.63% 
Female 7373 32.78% 32.56% 27.17% 5.387% 397 16.55% 
Overall 14523 36.48% 36.57% 32.10% 4.464% 648 12.21% 
aggregate job classes, for male and female employees, and overall. The resuhs suggest that 
comparable worth increased union membership 12.2% or about 648 members per year. This 
corresponds to an increase of about 4.5 percentage points in the membership rate. The 
magnitude is expected considering the estimated wage elasticities. Comparable worth wage 
adjustments did not affect each occupational category/ equally. As seen in Figure 5.4 
previously, the average wage increase is the largest in the Service/Blue Collar occupations. It 
follows that the impact on membership would thus be the largest for this occupation. 
Comparable worth increased Service/Blue Collar membership by an estimated 390 members 
per year, about 12.9%, during 1885-1992. The predicted membership rate is estimated to be 
6.9 percentage points higher, more than twice the rate increase in the other occupations. The 
number of members among Clerical workers increased by 14.2% per year over the period 
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1985-1992. This corresponds to 133 members per year. The impact on Professional and in 
Technical workers is similar. Comparable worth increased membership for Professionals by 
65 members (8.5%) per year, while Technical membership increased by 60 members (10.3%) 
per year. 
As stated before, the estimated elasticities for wages are large. Thus, it should be 
cxpcctcd that the wage changes induced by comparable worth would have an estimated 
permanent effect on union membership. If no other relative wage shocks occur, the estimated 
models should provide predictions of the impact of comparable worth that converge to a 
constant percentage point increase. This in fact will not happen bccause other changes occur 
throughout the period. 
Figure 6.1 graphs the estimated increase in members by year, and Figure 6.2 graphs 
the estimated change in the membership rate resuhing from comparable worth wage changes. 
It seems clear that effects of comparable worth are not temporary. After the period of 
comparable worth wage gains, the impact seems to flatten out to slightly more than 600 
members per year. One should keep in mind that the model has annual dummy variables that 
arc capturing the overall effect of the comparable worth, among other things. Excluding the 
annual dummies from the model resulted in an increase in the estimated impact of comparable 
worth by about 20 members per year. The number of covered workers peaked in 1990. and 
thus this year had the largest estimated impact of comparable worth on the number of 
members. Since the actual membership rate continued to climb towards 50% throughout the 
post comparable worth period, the estimated difference in the membership rate also climbed'". 
" The marginal efTect is deiermined by the wage parameters and the value of the density (unction. The density function 
rcachcs a maximum when the cumulative distribution function is 0.5. 
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Comparable worth adjustments tended to be larger in jobs traditionally donunated by 
females. Thus, wc should expect to sec a larger increase in female membership, which the 
estimates support. Female membership increased by an estimated 16.6% (397 members per 
year), while male membership was increased by 8.6% (251 members). Figure 6.3 displays the 
, : 1 1 
1986 1988 1990 1992 
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predicted^ and the counterfactual membership estimates for each year. There is an apparent 
upswing in membership during the post-comparable worth years. This was true for both 
males and females. However, the impact on the female membership appears to be larger. 
This reinforces the idea that comparable worth had its largest effects on jobs that were 
traditionally dominated by females. Thus, the comparable worth wage caused a 
disproportionate increase in female membership. 
0.60 - 1—Predicted Male 
Counterfactual Male | 
Predicted Female 0.50 
Counterfactual Female S zsl 
"I 0.40 
0.30 
0.20 ^^ ^ 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Year 
Figure 6.3 - Annual Predicted and Counterfactual Membership Rates for Males and 
females 
6.5 Conclusions 
The union demand model developed in chapter 4 was extended to control for non-
random selection of workers in the state labor market. The control for non-random selection 
was developed from the model of quits developed in Chapter 5. 
^ Since annual dununies are included in the model, there is afanost no diflerence between the actual and the aggregate 
predicted membership rate for each year. 
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Sclcction bias docs appear to affcct the model estimates. The most notable change is 
that the estimated elasticity for their own dues contributions becomes very close to unity. 
This suggcst.s an equilibrium where union dues revenue is maximized. The relative 
magnitudes of own contributions and the contributions of others again suggest the joint 
product model is appropriate. While the contributions of others affect membership, they are 
far from perfect substitutes for their own contributions. 
There appears to be a more elastic response to private wage gains than to non-
cmployec specific rates of wage increase. This is consistent with the union providing 
members some benefits that are not provided to non-members. However, the ability to 
exclude the non-members would negate the union argument that free riders weaken the 
union's ability to provide collective bargaining at an optimal level. It is more likely that state 
employees who gel atypical wage gains arc more favorably disposed to the public sector 
union. 
Comparable worth wage adjustments provided an exogenous shock to relative wages 
that is critical when estimating the demand for union services. The estimates suggest that 
comparable worth increased union membership by about 650 members per year. Since 
females were in jobs which got larger wage increases, large membership increases were 
observed among females. Similarly. Service/Blue Collar and Clerical workers had the largest 
increases in membership. 
Selection does not affect the qualitative conclusions derived earlier. Full time, non-
white, female, single, and Service/Bluc Collar workers value union services nwre. This 
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implies that one need not be overly concerned with non-random selection when trying to make 
qualitative statements about different sub-groups of the labor pool. 
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS 
This study developed a model of unioti membership in a framework where union 
membership jointly produces a public and private goods. Included in the model are measures 
of the wage increases that go to individuals and wage increases that go to the group as a 
whole. In addition, the model includes measures to control for the price of union membership. 
Thus, willingness to pay at the margin is also addressed. 
The data used in this study provided significant advantages in modeling union 
membership. Because public sector union membership is voluntary, it is possible to identify 
the demand for union services separately from the decision to accept employment in the public 
sector. The data contains detailed wage information on both individual wages and wage 
scales for jobs. Individual wages were subject to exogenous shocks from comparable worth 
wage adjustments that occurred during the sample period. Shocks to relative wages are rare 
in public sector labor markets. Most studies have not been able to control for union dues and, 
thus, have not been able to address willingness to pay for union services. Finally, the data 
allowed estimation of an empirical model of quits This model was used to provide statistical 
controls for non-random selection. 
Union membership is very responsive to wage gains. As found in some other studies, 
union membership is positively related to earnings. Membership was found to be wage elastic. 
Also, membership appears to be more responsive to idiosyncratic wage gains than wage gains 
that accrue to all employees. The model was also used to estimate the impact that comparable 
worth wage increases had on membership. The wage gains from comparable worth increased 
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membership by over \2%. This is consistent with the actual increase in membership that is 
observed in the post-comparable worth period. 
Union membership appears to be price incIastic when sclcction bias i s  not controlled 
for. Oncc controls for the potential bias are included, it appears that union membership is 
unitary clastic. It does not appear that other's contributions arc close substitutes for own 
contributions. This suggests that union contributions arc. for the most part, private goods. 
Most exits occur in the early years of the employment relationship. Thus, early in the 
employment relationship, the likelihood of observing an exit declines as the individual gains 
state-spccific experience. Quits are negatively related to wage gains and positively related to 
private sector wage gains. As a result of this estimated relationship, comparable worth wage 
gains reduced incentives for female and traditionally lower wage employees to exit. This 
estimated decrease in female quit rate is corroborated by an observed increase in the 
proportion of females in the state labor force. 
Funhcr study on the demand for private good aspects union scrxaces could be 
enhanced if one could have access to data on grievance procedures and other measures of 
employee/management relations. 
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APPENDIX - COMPARATIVE STATICS OF JOINT PRODUCT MODEL 
Comparative static results will be derived for (2.7). Throughout this appendix the i subscripts 
w ill be suppressed unless ii is necessarv- for clarity. The first order conditions for this problem as 
listed in (2.8) are 
4 ^ /  =  i , y  -  ^ - F v  =  0 0  A . !  
^2 ^ ^ ) - ^-Px ~ ^ 
=  /  -  P y X i  -  P x X i  =  0 0  A . 3  
The Jacobian is 
J = 
1 cy. 1 1 
i ^2 
_ 
4-i a-, CA 
V 
V a-, 
yy 
B 
-Pv 
B 
A 
-Px 
-Py 
-Px 
0 y 
A.4 
where: A s U^/(x)- -r 2lj^,g'(x)t'(x) ^ U„g'(x)- -i- U/'(x) ^  U,g"(x) 
BH U,/(X) - U,,g'(x) 
|J' > 0 for maximum 
The comparative static for a change in others' contributions X' can be expressed as 
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Using Cramer's rule one can solve for cx/cX' as 
A . 6  
1 
B -
ex. r P :  
- p .  
- p .  
0 
u 
P . P . U . . g ' ( x , ^ X j  - -  p \  (  u K  ) f ' M  u = g ' ( x , ' ^ K ) '  ~  ^ • - g ' V - y . +  
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The marginal change in agent's consumption of y when the contributions of others increase is 
^ )-^t=S'ix, + K)' - ) --J - p .  I  
0 ^^ 
ki 
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The comparative static effects of changes in income can be represented as 
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The marginal effect of changes in income on consumption of y can again be derived using Cramer's 
rule. The comparative static for y is 
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The comparative static results with respect to p, are derived from 
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